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Alternative  Approaches  to  the 
Political  Business  Cycle 
It is impossible  to consider  the ordinary  course  of affairs  in the United  States 
without  perceiving  that  the desire  to be re-elected  is the chief  aim  of the 
President;  . . . and that  especially  as [the election]  approaches,  his  personal 
interest  takes  the  place of his interest  in the  public  good. 
-Alexis  de Tocqueville,  Democracy  in America 
WHILE  political  economy has increasingly  concentrated  upon  the behav- 
ior of markets,  in some areas it is impossible  to ignore the interaction 
between  economic motivation  and  political  decisions. The theory  of the 
political  business cycle, which analyzes the interaction  of political and 
economic systems, arose from the obvious facts of life that voters care 
about  the economy while politicians  care about  power. 
This  paper  reviews  the theory  and  evidence  about  interacting  politico- 
economic systems in the theory of the political business cycle (PBC). 
The first section begins with an overview of different approaches to 
political cycles. The following two sections review some theoretical 
issues, with attention  to the issue of the behavior  of political  parties  and 
a formal  examination  of PBC models. The final  sections assess whether 
the PBC  models  are consistent  with historical  evidence. 
The author  is grateful  for helpful  comments  from Ray Fair, Robert  Inman, Dennis 
Mueller,  the Yale Workshop  in Macroeconomics,  and members  of the Brookings  Panel. 
In addition,  able  research  assistance  was provided  by Akiva Dickstein,  Donald  Smythe, 
and  Zili  Yang. 
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Macroeconomics  and Macropolitics 
It is well, before plunging  into a thicket of PBC models and data, to 
begin with a survey of the forest. In most macroeconomic studies, 
political  factors  are  taken  as exogenous. The  PBC  approach,  by contrast, 
analyzes  how the economy  behaves  when  political  and  economic  factors 
interact  with one another. 
Five sets of questions  are central  to PBC models. 
-Voters.  What  governs voter behavior?  Do economic events loom 
large in voting behavior? Are voters rational and well informed or 
irrational  and  poorly  informed?  Are  voters  backward-looking  orforward- 
looking? 
-Parties.  What  motivates political  leaders or parties (for succinct- 
ness, I label  those who seek political  office  as "parties")?  Are they vote- 
maximizing  and opportunistic,  or do they ideologically  pursue a set of 
economic  and social objectives as they serve a given constituency? 
-Economic  structure. What is the structure  of the economy? Can 
parties  affect economic outcomes, or is policy ineffective?  What  are the 
important  instruments  of policy (for example, fiscal policy, transfer 
payments, monetary policy), and who controls them (the president, 
Congress,  the central  bank)? 
-Shocks.  What are the shocks to politics and the economy? Are 
shocks external (such as from hurricanes,  droughts,  foreign wars, and 
revolutions)?  Are they internal  to the political process (as when one 
president  leaves his successor a large deficit or a high inflation  rate to 
reduce)? 
-Competence.  Do parties  pursue  their  objectives  competently  (that 
is, efficiently),  or do they bumble  around,  neither  satisfying  voters nor 
achieving  their  ideological  objectives? 
Studies over the past few years have explored many different ap- 
proaches  to these five issues. The two sets of issues that have received 
the most attention  concern the rationality  of voters and the behavior  of 
parties. 
On  the first  question,  a central  dispute  in the PBC  literature  (as indeed 
in much of economics) revolves around  whether voters have rational 
expectations about both economic policy and party platforms.  Voters William  D. Nordhaus  3 
are said to be ultrarational  if they have rational  expectations, possess 
all available  information,  and evaluate parties by comparing  their ex- 
pected  future  performances.  If voters  fall short  of this standard,  they are 
said to be nonrational.  The sin of nonrationality  comes in many  forms; 
a fuller  discussion  follows in later  sections. 
The other  major  issue concerns whether  parties  are opportunistic  or 
ideological.  Parties  are said to be opportunistic  if they choose policies 
to maximize  the probability  of election (or reelection)  without  regard  to 
past positions, the views of the party faithful, or actual economic 
outcomes. Parties  are said to be ideological if they set policies to attain 
certain  economic and social objectives and  give no independent  weight 
to gaining  office or to political  popularity. 
In practice, many politico-economic  models assume that voters do 
not possess all available  information  and are backward-looking  rather 
than  forward-looking.  In addition,  PBC models differ  on party motiva- 
tion. These issues are considered  in detail  later  in this paper. 
What  follows is a survey  of five  main  approaches  of the  PBC  literature, 
focusing on the particular assumptions embodied in each and the 
predictions  that each makes  about  the outcome of the political  business 
cycle. This discussion is meant to illuminate  rather  than exhaust the 
subject,  and  a later  section provides  a formal  analysis  of PBC models.  i 
Model  1. Opportunistic parties,  nonrational  voters ("opportunistic 
cycle"). One of the first approaches to be  systematically explored 
combines  vote-maximizing  parties and nonrational  voters.2  In this ap- 
proach, voters evaluate incumbents  by examining  performance  retro- 
spectively;  they  do not  attempt  to predict  future  performance.  Moreover, 
incumbents  choose economic  policies to maximize  their  vote at the next 
election. These models analyze the choice between inflation  and  unem- 
ployment,  where  low unemployment  today  leads to higher  inflation  now 
and  in the future. 
The two main predictions  of this model are, first, that parties will 
engage  in anti-inflation  policies early  in the electoral  cycle and stimulate 
the economy as elections approach,  and, second, because of the retro- 
1. There  are  several  useful  surveys  of the general  literature.  One  of the most balanced 
is Paldam  (1981),  which  is particularly  insightful  in linking  the economic  and  the political 
science  literature. 
2. See Nordhaus  (1975)  and  MacRae  (1977). 4  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
spective evaluation of voters, the political system has a short time 
horizon  and  will move to a high-inflation  equilibrium. 
Model 2. Ideological parties, nonrational voters ("ideological cycle"). 
A second approach, developed by Douglas Hibbs, also examines the 
interaction  of politics with unemployment  and inflation.3  In Hibbs's 
approach,  parties are ideologically identifiable  (for example, left and 
right);  "left-wing"  parties  choose high  inflation  and  low unemployment, 
while "right-wing"  parties  choose low inflation  and  high  unemployment. 
Voters choose the parties that best represent  their preferences. In the 
ideological  cycle, economic policies change  when the party  in power is 
replaced, not as it manipulates  the economy in order to be reelected. 
Policies change as parties replace one another  more than they evolve 
within  the electoral  cycle as elections approach. 
Model 3. Ultrarational  voters. One of the most influential  criticisms 
of PBC theory derives from the approach  that assumes that voters are 
ultrarational-that is, they have the same information  as parties, are 
forward-looking,  and  suffer  from  no memory  lapses.4 In such  a situation, 
parties cannot "fool" voters by undertaking  partisan  manipulation  of 
the economy. If, for example, the government  were to stimulate  the 
economy  before  an election-hoping that  present  pleasures  would  in the 
voters' minds  outweigh  potential  future  pains-the  ultrarational  voters 
would  quickly  see through  the manipulative  policies. As a result,  rational 
opportunistic  parties-knowing that they could not fool the voters- 
would not attempt  to manipulate  the economy and would therefore  not 
induce  a political  business cycle. 
This approach  obviously depends crucially  upon the ultrarationality 
of voters  and  parties.  There  have  been  few attempts  to test the hypothesis 
of ultrarationality  in the PBC framework,  although  it has a number  of 
implications  that  are tested in this paper. 
Model 4. Shocks external to the political system. In the models already 
described,  economic shocks either  arise  from  the political  system (as in 
model 1) or do not have explicit sources (as in models 2 and 3). An 
alternative  approach  emphasizes shocks from external  events, such as 
from  war  or revolution. 
For concreteness, assume that the unfavorable  shock consists of a 
3. See Hibbs  (1977,  1982,  1987). 
4.  An early  statement  was in McCallum  (1978). William  D. Nordhaus  5 
purely  external  event, such as foul weather.  In the case of opportunistic 
parties, the system's responses will depend upon the rationality of 
voters. Ultrarational  voters will recognize that the incumbent  party is 
not responsible, and the event will have no effect on the parties' 
popularity;  moreover,  the policy response to the shock will be indepen- 
dent of the party in power. Poorly informed  voters, however, might 
easily misunderstand  the source of the shock, blaming  the incumbents 
and  voting  them  out of office. 
In the case of ideological  parties, the response is more complicated. 
Rational  voters will respond  to an external  shock by asking  which party 
is best equipped to deal with the shock. An inflationary  shock, for 
example,  might  induce  voters  to turn  to conservative  governments,  while 
a depression  might  benefit  left-wing  parties.  The shock would therefore 
be followed by a change of regime  and a change in policy; by contrast 
with the case in the previous paragraph,  the policy response would in 
some sense be caused by the shock although  it was executed by the 
ideological  party. 
No study has attempted  to separate  the impact of external shocks 
from the role of parties. Three pieces of evidence are suggestive here. 
First, it appears  that  voters respond  to external  shocks much  as they do 
to induced shocks. The response of voters to oil-shock or food-shock 
inflation  during  the 1970s  was difficult  to distinguish  from  voter  response 
to demand-pull  inflation.  Second, the impact  of external  shocks on party 
popularity  appears not to depend upon the party in power; voters 
disapprove of both conservative and liberal governments whenever 
either inflation  or unemployment  rises. Third, an examination  of the 
regime  shifts  during  the two oil shocks shows no automatic  shift toward 
conservative  governments.  Of  eleven changes  of regime  in major  OECD 
countries  in the period  immediately  following  the two oil shocks, seven 
moved  in a conservative  direction,  while four  moved toward  the left.5 
Model 5. Differences in competence.  In the 1988 presidential election, 
candidate  Dukakis argued, "This election is about competence, not 
ideology." This remark  suggests an approach  in which popularity  and 
elections  respond  to voters'  judgment  of the competence  rather  than  the 
ideology  of parties. 
5. The  regime  shifts  are  listed  in  Alesina  (1989,  table  1).  The  period  of the first  oil shock 
was January  1974  through  December  1975,  while the period  of the second oil shock was 
January  1978  through  December  1981. 6  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
What  is meant by competence? A party is competent to the extent 
that it manages the economy efficiently. Competence requires that 
parties acquire the best available information  on the structure  of the 
economy and use that information  effectively. Perfect competence 
implies  Pareto-efficient  outcomes. The first  four  models  assume  that  the 
parties are perfectly competent; the parties might act in pigheadedly 
ideological  ways or in venal, opportunistic  ways, but they do not waste 
resources  through  foolish and inefficient  actions. 
A promising  strategy  would  be to allow  for differences  in competence 
among  parties  to motivate  both voter evaluation  and  political  behavior. 
One approach  would  focus on voter evaluation  of parties. Voters might 
then choose between parties because of different  perceived levels of 
competence  rather  than  because of differing  ideologies. A model incor- 
porating  differing  competence has been proposed by Kenneth Rogoff 
and  Anne Sibert,  who argue  that  informational  asymmetries  can induce 
changes in fiscal policy that are timed to influence  elections.6  Another 
approach,  suggested  by Charles  Schultze  in his comments  on this paper, 
rests on the observation  that  parties  operate  with different  "models" of 
reality and that the models tend to harmonize  with the party policy 
preferences.  In both cases, incompetent  parties  have somehow  failed  to 
use all the available  information  and  are  therefore  showing  symptoms  of 
irrationality. 
This brief survey only hints at the richness of the possible outcomes 
of these and  many  other  approaches  to PBC  models. Table  1 summarizes 
the assumptions  and some salient findings  of the five approaches  de- 
scribed above. One crucial point emerges from this survey: given the 
variety  of institutions,  party  structures,  sources of shocks, and degrees 
of rationality  and competence, it is most unlikely  that any clear pattern 
of politico-economic  behavior  will emerge.  Moreover,  like anomalies  in 
financial markets, regularities  in the political cycle are likely to be 
gradually  eroded as political  institutions  evolve or as economic agents 
or voters learn  about  manipulative  political  behavior. 
6. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) assume that governments, which differ in levels of 
competence, learn about their competence  before the public does and are able to hide 
incompetence  from the public until after the election. A skeptic might observe that 
politicians  are  often  the last people  to discover  their  own incompetence. William D. Nordhaus  7 
Ideological  Political Parties in the PBC 
Before analyzing  alternative  models of political  business cycles, it is 
necessary to consider in more detail the debate in the PBC literature 
about  the behavior  of parties:  are  they opportunistic  vote maximizers  or 
are they ideological  and  issue-oriented? 
Following  Anthony  Downs, the  canonical  economic  model  of electoral 
competition holds that "parties formulate policies in order to win 
elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate  policies."7 
Surprisingly,  the economic literature  on public  choice has stayed on the 
trail of the convergence theory of politics blazed by Hotelling and 
Downs. Under  this theory, parties'  platforms  will tend to converge to a 
common  policy, which represents  the preferences  of the median  voter.8 
The "median-voter  theorem" has been enormously influential  in the 
growing  public-choice  literature. 
Only  recently  has the Downsian  approach  of early PBC models been 
complemented  by ideological models that take into account what a 
glance  at political  history  reveals:  that, at different  times and  in different 
measures, both ideology and opportunism  are important  motivating 
forces. 
The compelling  feature of the hypothesis of vote maximizing  is that 
getting  elected is a necessary  condition  for implementing  one's program. 
But to argue  that getting  elected is all that motivates politicians  is akin 
to arguing  that winning  law suits is the only objective of lawyers-an 
argument  that  overlooks  the fact that  90 percent  of criminal  cases end in 
plea-bargained  "losses"  by the defense. Parties, like lawyers, are 
concerned  with the substantive  outcomes of their  ventures. 
A more  persuasive  approach  is to assume that parties  are concerned 
both with being elected per se and with the substantive  political out- 
comes. A natural  objective function for the party is Wk{E[Uk(x)],  Pk}, 
where  Wk  is the preference  function  of the kth  party,  E[Uk(x)]  represents 
the expected  utility  of the outcome according  to the ideology  of party  k, 
7. Downs  (1957,  p. 28). 
8. This section  will not consider  the multitude  of unsettled  issues of political  theory, 
many  of which  are  analyzed  in Ordeshook  (1986). ct  o  o  c  c  o  DE  E  c= 
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U is the ideology  or  utility  function  of the party  over economic  outcomes, 
x is the economic policy and outcome, and  Pk iS the probability  of party 
k being in power. When a party  puts all the weight on the first term of 
W{  }, it is purely ideological, concerned only with the substantive 
economic outcome. When the party puts all the weight on the second 
term,  Pk, the preference  function  reduces to that of the purely  opportu- 
nistic party  of the Hotelling-Downs  model. 
It is useful to compare  the results of the pure ideological  model with 
the traditional  results of Downsian  vote-maximizing  parties.9  The most 
important  result is that, with ideological parties, a stable equilibrium 
may  exist in which  parties  have different  policies. The logic of this result 
is straightforward.  Assume that there are two parties, the liberals (L) 
and the conservatives (C), and that each announces a policy about 
economic variable  x. The preferences of the parties are given by the 
parameter  a,  where x  =  ak  iS  the preferred  policy of the kth party. 
Assume that  aXL  <  axm  <  ?xc, where  OtL  is the preferred  policy of the liberal 
party,  atm  that  of the median  voter, and  oxc  that  of the conservative  party. 
To see why purely ideological parties tend to diverge, assume the 
contrary,  that both parties start out with initial  platforms  representing 
the median  voter. By moving  a little  bit away  from  the center  and  toward 
its preferred  position, either  party  can do no worse and  has the prospect 
of gaining  power to implement  its policies. This shows that identical 
policies are not an equilibrium  with purely  ideological  parties. 
The behavior  of ideological  parties can be examined  by simplifying 
the general  preference  function introduced  above and solving numeri- 
cally for the equilibriums.  Assume that the W function is additively 
separable  and  that  the parties'  utility  functions  are quadratic.  Using the 
independence  axiom  of expected-utility  theory, the preference  function 
should  be linear  in the probabilities.  The objective for party  L can be 
written  as 
(1)  max WL{E[UL(x)], PL} =  -[PL(XL  -  aL)  +  PC(XC  -  aL)] 
{XL} 
+  (1 -  0)1PL, 
where  the  two terms  in  equation  1  represent  the two arguments  in WL{  }. 
9. The most persuasive  analysis  for ideological  parties  has been made in pioneering 
work  by Wittman  (1977, 1983);  that  latter  paper  is the best available  survey  of the theory 
and  evidence  on ideological  parties. 10  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
In addition,  13  is the relative  weight  on ideology; (1-  ,B)  is the weight on 
the prospect of gaining  office;  PL  is the probability  of party  L winning 
the election;  Pc  =  1  -  PL;  XL is the stated platform  or position of party 
L (which is also the outcome if party L wins the election); aXL is the 
preferred  position  of party  L; and q is a scale factor that represents  the 
value placed  on winning  elections by purely  opportunistic  parties. 
I consider  an election  game  in which  parties  simultaneously  pick their 
strategies  (that is, each chooses its Xk), with each party assuming  that 
the other  will not change  its last position. Moreover,  to avoid problems 
of time consistency, I assume that parties implement  their promises. 
These assumptions  lead to the following  maximization  by party  L: 
dxL  =  -2  (XL  -  OL)PL  -  A 
{1P[(XL  -  AL)  -  (XC  -  AL)] 
-  TO(1-  WI)}  =  0. 
From  this equation,  it is easily seen that  as the party  places a greater  and 
greater  weight on electoral victory (as 3 tends to zero), this becomes 
aPL/aXL  =  0. This implies that, for 3  =  0 (pure opportunism),  PL  is 
maximized,  which is the standard  Hotelling-Downs  convergence  result. 
The general  case is 
(2)  aPL  _  2a  (XL  -  OL)PL 
aXL  R[(XL  -  aL)2  -  (XC  -  aL)2]  -  q(1 -  ) 
For the polar  ideological  party,  where ,B  =  1, the equation  reduces to 
(3)  aPL  1  2(XL  -  0L) 
aXL  PL  (XL  -  OtL)  -  (XC  -  atL)2 
The left-hand side of equation 3 represents the semi-elasticity  of the 
probability  of winning with respect to policy. In equilibrium,  this is 
equated to the marginal  disutility of moving away from the party's 
preference  (in  the numerator  of the right-hand  side) divided  by the utility 
of the distance  between the parties  (in the right  denominator).  As long 
as economic policy can affect election outcomes, the left-hand  side of 
equation  3 will be finite  and positive. This implies  that  the denominator 
of the right-hand  side will be nonzero, which signifies  that parties  have 
not converged. 
Closing  the model requires  an assumption  about  voter behavior.  The 
problem  can be simplified  by specifying that parties are symmetrical William  D. Nordhaius  11 
mirror  images in preferences  and behavior, and that the probability  of 
electoral  victory  is an unbiased  quadratic  function  of party  policies. The 
probability  of party L winning is then given by the aggregate  voting 
function: 
(4)  PL  =  1 -PC  =  -  -  U(XL  -  am)2  +  (J(Xc  -  CLf)2;  0  CO  PL, PC  <  1.  c  2 
This equation  states that the probability  of party  L winning  equals one- 
half minus  a coefficient  ur  times the squared  divergence  of party  L from 
the median voter plus the same term for party C. The coefficient uf 
represents  the sensitivity of voter behavior to the deviation of policy 
from the median  voter. The parameter  1/2  reflects the assumption  that 
the voting function is unbiased. I assume that parties know the voting 
function. 
The  political  equilibrium  can be calculated  numerically  using  the first- 
order  conditions  in equation  2 along  with  the voting  function  in equation 
4. I have calibrated  the equations  by imposing  symmetry  on the prefer- 
ences of the two parties. The major  scaling  parameters  are determined 
as follows: the ur  coefficient  in the voting function  is set so that a party 
that moves halfway from the median voter to its preferred  position 
lowers its probability  of election from 0.5 to 0.25. The other major 
coefficient  is the relative weight of ideology and opportunism  (the ,), 
which  varies  in the experiments  that  follow.  10 
The calculations  provide  a mixture  of comfort  and surprise,  but only 
the high points will be summarized  here. Figure 1 shows.  a family of 
curves, each of which traces  out the probability  of victory  by party  L as 
a function  of L's policies (on  the horizontal  axis)  for  five different  policies 
of party  C. There  are no surprises  here:  the highest  curve  represents  the 
outcome  with party  C at C's most preferred  policy (xc = 0.2), while the 
lowest represents the outcome with party C's policy targeted at the 
median  voter. 
Figure  2 shows the same family of curves for the expected utility of 
party L when party L  is purely ideological. These results are quite 
10. The  exact calculated  equations  are  the following: 
WL{E[UL(x)], PL} =  -P{PL[XL  -(-  0.2)]2+pC[XC-  (-  0.2)]2} +  (1  -P)PL, 
Wc{E[Uc(x)],  Pc)  =  -P1 [PL(XL-  0.2)2  + Pc(Xc -  0. 2)2]  +  (1 -)PC 
PL  =  1 -  Pc  =  1/2 -  25 [(XL)2  -  (XC)2]. 
Also note that  ot, = ?, OtL=  -  0.2, (cX=  0.2, m = 1, and  P1L  =  P1C  =  1 12  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Figure 1.  Probability of Election of Party L for Five Different Values of Party C Policiesa 
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a.  Figure depicts  equation 4, the probability of electoral  victory  of party L as function of party L policies  for five 
differentfixed  values  of party C policies.  The policy  variable is x and runs from  -0.5  to  +0.5,  with x  =  0 for the 
median voter.  Party L's  preferred policy  is for x  =  -0.2,  while  party C's  preferred policy  is for x  =  +0.2.  This 
figure shows  the manner in which  party L's  probability  of election  declines  as party L's  policy  moves  away  from 
the median voter. 
complex, for the objective function of the purely ideological party is 
affected by both the election probabilities  and the positions of both 
parties.  There  is no simple  relationship  between a party's  utility  and its 
opposition's  policy. Party  L attains  its highest  utility  when  its opposition 
adopts extreme  policies  (xc  =  0.2)  because  this both guarantees  the 
election to party  L and also ensures an outcome favorable  to party  L's 
ideology.  By contrast,  the least favorable  policies for  party  L come when 
party  C  behaves  as the "reasonable  opposition"  and  adopts  a moderately 
right-of-center  position; such a tactic gives party C a good prospect of 
electoral  success while  raising  the probability  of victory  that  is repugnant 
to party  L. William D. Nordhaus  13 
Figure  2. Party  L's Utility  as a Function  of Its Policy  for Five Different  Values  of Party 
C's Policiesa 
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a.  Figure  shows  attained  value  of  preference  function  in equation  1 as  function  of  party policies  for  a purely 
ideological party (p  =  0). Each curve  shows  the level  of preference  function  of party L as its policies  vary but for 
fixed value of party C policies. 
Figure 3 plots the optimal policy of party L for different party C 
policies and  for different  degrees of opportunism.  The top curve shows 
the optimal  policy of a purely  opportunistic  party  L as a function  of the 
policies of party C (on the horizontal  axis). This calculation  confirms 
that  purely  opportunistic  parties set policies that represent  the median 
voter (that  is, XL  =  oX, =  0). The family  of curves moves downward  as 
ideology progressively  displaces opportunism,  with the bottom curve 
representing  the reaction  function of the purely ideological  party. For 
ideological  parties, the policy response to the opposition is relatively 
small  at first.  However, as the opposition  turns  extreme  and becomes a 
long-shot, party L can afford to move sharply away from the center 14  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Figure 3.  Party L's Reaction Functions for Varying Ideology Parameters 
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a.  Figure shows  the reaction function  of party L for varying ideological  parameters (  =  0.0  through  1.0) given 
party C's  policy.  It also  shows  the symmetrical  Nash  equilibrium of purely ideological  (  =  1.0) conservative  and 
liberal parties. 
toward its preferred  position. Note as well that the reaction of party 
policies changes sign in response to changes  in its opposition's  policy. 
It is easy to calculate the outcome where each party sets its policy 
assuming  that the other's policy is unchanged  (which yields the Nash 
equilibrium).  For two symmetrical,  purely  ideological  parties,  the Nash 
equilibrium  occurs with  XL  =  -  XC =  -  0.06, and it is stable for small 
changes in parameters.  The equilibrium  for a single party is labeled as 
the Nash equilibrium  in figure  3. 
I conclude with six general  remarks  about  the model described  here 
before  applying  it to PBC theory. The first  point is that models incorpo- 
rating  ideology  can  lead  to a stable  equilibrium  of divergent  party  policies. 
The  extent  of the divergence  depends  on the relative  strength  of ideology 
and  opportunism  and  on the degree  of voter sensitivity  to issues, as well 
as on the extent to which parties' fundamental  beliefs diverge. The 
political convergence found in the Hotelling-Downs model depends 
crucially  upon  parties  being single-mindedly  devoted to gaining  office. William  D. Nordhaus  15 
Second, it follows from  the divergence  thesis that ideological  parties 
are  not  as responsive  to voters' revealed  preferences  as are  opportunistic 
parties.  A uniform  shift  of 0 to the left or right  in the distribution  of voter 
preferences  will be reflected in a shift of exactly 0 in the positions of 
opportunistic  parties. By contrast, the reaction of ideological parties 
will be more limited, with the degree of reaction depending  upon the 
strength  of ideology, the shape  of the voting  function,  and  the bias in the 
voting  function.  For  example,  for  the Nash equilibrium  shown  in figure  3, 
if the median voter moves halfway to the position of party L,  the 
equilibrium  positions of the parties move by only 80 percent of the 
preference  shift. 
A third  point  attenuates  the force of the nonrepresentational  result  of 
pointtwo. As parties  become  more  ideological,  theirpolicies  increasingly 
diverge  from  the tastes of the median  voter. The overall  performance  of 
an  economy  will  often  be determined  by the  average policy-the  average 
saving  rate  or investment  rate. The average  economic  policy (that  is, the 
weighted  average  of parties'  policies) does not necessarily  diverge  from 
the median  as parties  become more  ideological.  In the symmetrical  case 
shown in figures 1 through  4, the average policy of ideological  parties 
represents exactly the position of  the median voter. Indeed, with 
symmetrical  parties and preferences, the average economic outcome 
will be unaffected  by the degree of ideological divergence. Moreover, 
because  the probabilities  of victory  shift  in  favor  of more  centrist  parties, 
shifts in underlying  preferences will be reflected in average outcomes 
that shift by more than the average change in party platforms.  In the 
example  described  at the end of the previous paragraph,  the expected 
value  of the policy change  moves by 97  percent  of the shift  in preferences 
even though  each party  moves substantially  less. 
Fourth,  it is sometimes  difficult  to distinguish  ideological  from  oppor- 
tunistic  behavior.  At first  blush, it might  appear  that  a purely  ideological 
party  would cling to its principles  and never compromise  its policies to 
win  office. But  in  fact a party  may  increase  its expected utility  by moving 
away from  its most preferred  policy. By moving  toward  the center, for 
example, party L lowers the probability that party C will win and 
introduce  C's repugnant  policies. This observation  is merely  a formali- 
zation  of the  canonicaljustification  for  political  compromises-that even 
a party's  compromised  policies are superior  to those of its opposition. 
Fifth, despite the above similarity  in behavior of opportunistic  and 
ideological  parties,  the two react  quite  differently  to shifts  in underlying 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
parameters.11  To begin with, as parties  become more ideological, they 
tend to move away from the center of the ideological spectrum. In 
addition,  as voters become less sensitive to (or more ignorant  about) 
issues, ideological parties tend to move away from the center, while 
opportunistic  parties stay at the center. Another way of putting this 
proposition  is to say that as voters become more perfectly informed 
about party positions, the vote function becomes more peaked and 
parties  tend to converge. Moreover, if the vote function  is biased (that 
is, if the intercept  moves away from 1/2),  this will induce  changes  in the 
behavior  of ideological  parties  but not of opportunistic  parties. Also, if 
voters' preferences  become more dispersed (in the sense of a median- 
preserving  spread),  this will not affect opportunistic  parties, but it will 
tend to lead to greater  divergence  of ideological  parties. 
Finally,  critics  of PBC  theory  sometimes  argue  that  ideological  parties 
would not engage in the manipulative  policies described  by the theory 
of opportunistic  cycles. As the discussion  in this section shows, such an 
assertion  is incorrect.  To the extent that  purely  ideological  parties  desire 
to implement  their  policies, they may choose to exploit voter ignorance 
or myopia  to increase their  reelection chances. Put differently,  if voter 
behavior allows opportunistic  cycles,  that same behavior will allow 
parties  to pursue  ideological  objectives  because  attainment  of ideological 
objectives  requires  election  as a precondition  for implementing  a party's 
program.  This  final  point  suggests, and  the next section  explores  further, 
the fact that  purely  ideological  parties  will undertake  behavior  that  looks 
quite  opportunistic. 
Formal Models of Political Cycles 
In the formal  analysis of political  business cycles that  follows, voter 
decisions and party choices are illustrated  with the trade-off  between 
inflation  and unemployment.  I pause to underline,  however, that this 
analysis  applies  more  broadly  to all decisions that  involve intertemporal 
trade-offs. 
Innumerable  government decisions involve trade-offs over time. 
Aside from  the classic example  of whether  to raise unemployment  now 
11. This  paragraph  draws  upon  a number  of observations  from  Wittman  (1983). William  D. Nordhaus  17 
in order to enjoy lower inflation  in the future, similar  macroeconomic 
decisions involve the choice between public consumption  and invest- 
ment, or between raising  taxes today or borrowing  today and raising 
taxes tomorrow. Countries that choose not to pay today must pay 
tomorrow.  If they enjoy overvalued  exchange  rates today, they do so at 
the expense of taking  the medicine  of a harsh  austerity  package  tomor- 
row. When Latin American  governments  decided to borrow  abroad  in 
the 1970s,  they were choosing a policy that raised  present wages at the 
expense of lower future  wages. 
Microeconomics offers similar examples in the savings-and-loan 
cover-up, in the postponement  of treatment  of toxic or nuclear  wastes, 
and  in  decisions  about  environmental  policy, such  as the  delays  in  control 
of  sulfur emissions. The common theme running through all these 
decisions is the choice between policies that raise consumption  today 
and those that raise consumption  tomorrow.  Whenever  the electorate 
has an imperfect  understanding  of the nature  of the trade-off,  parties  will 
be tempted  to shift  consumption  from  the future  to the present  as a way 
of increasing  electoral  support. 
For the most part, this study limits its analysis to the trade-offs  that 
involve the business cycle. I emphasize this issue, first, because the 
inflation-unemployment  trade-off  is well-established  and relatively sta- 
ble in the United States and, second, because cyclical movements  have 
powerful effects upon political outcomes. As  former British Prime 
Minister  Harold Wilson stated, "All political history shows that the 
standing  of the Government  and its ability  to hold the confidence  of the 
electorate  at a General  Election  depend  upon  the success of its economic 
policy. "12 
The following  analysis  assumes that  two parties  compete  for political 
power  and  that  voters evaluate  parties  on the basis of actual  or expected 
economic performance.  I begin with the opportunistic  cycle and then 
introduce  other  approaches. 
Opportunistic Cycles 
In the following analysis, electoral cycles have two periods, with 
t  =  1, 3, 5, . ..  , the first half of the cycle  and t =  2, 4, 6, . ..  , the 
12. Quoted  in Hibbs  and  Fassbender  (1981,  p. 31). 18  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
second half of the cycle. The economy is assumed  to behave according 
to the natural  rate  hypothesis.  Unemployment  and  inflation  are  inversely 
related  in the short  run  but are independent  in the long run;  that  is, there 
is a downward-sloping  Phillips curve in the short run but a vertical 
Phillips  curve at the natural  rate of unemployment  in the long run. The 
economic  dynamics  are assumed  to be stationary  and  given by 
(5)  iTt=  iTt-  -  a(ut -  u*) +  et, 
where Tr,  is the rate of inflation, ut is the unemployment  rate, u* is 
the natural  rate of unemployment,  and a is the stable Phillips curve 
coefficient. 
The error  term  in equation  5, et, represents  unpredictable  events that 
affect  inflation.  For simplicity,  I consider  only "supplv'  shocks," that  is, 
shocks that raise the rate of inflation for given levels of aggregate 
demand.  These shocks include  events such as the oil price increases of 
1973 and 1979, the exchange rate fluctuations  of the 1980s, and the 
frequent  bad harvests. Economic policy is assumed to determine  the 
unemployment  rate  without  error. 
Voters are assumed to have a distribution  of preferences between 
inflation  and  unemployment.  The aggregate  voting  function,  which  gives 
the probability  of election by the incumbent  party  I, is given by 
(6)  PI  =  Vt[ut,-  IU,  uTt  -  I,  1t]  = 
[ut2  +  b rr2 +  (1  +  1)-I(u21  +  br2_)]  +  o 
The voting function applies only to even-numbered  periods, t =  0, 2, 
4,.  . . ,  which are election  years.  Vt[  ] is the aggregate voting function 
relating  the fraction  of the vote gained  by the incumbent  in period t to 
economic conditions.  The factor  b is the inflation  aversion  of the voting 
function and pR  is a memory  factor that represents  the extent to which 
voters forget  past events. The parameter  X represents  the "bias" of the 
voting function, that is, the extent to which voters tend to reward  or 
penalize  the incumbent  party. I take the quadratic  form  for simplicity  of 
the later  calculations.13  In these equations,  u and Tr  represent  deviations 
13. The derivation  of an aggregate  voting function from individual  preferences  is 
subject  to well-known  difficulties.  An attempt  to make  this linkage  explicitly  for macro- 
economic variables  is discussed in Lepper (1974). Lepper derives an aggregate  voting 
function  under  the assumption  that there are well-defined  individual  preferences  about 
macroeconomic  outcomes  and that  voters are satisficers  who choose incumbents  if their William  D. Nordhaus  19 
from the optimal unemployment  and inflation rates. Obviously, the 
probabilities  lie in the range  [0, 1]. Finally, note that  this voting  function 
is backward-looking,  excluding  both the distant  past and expectations 
about  the future. 
An opportunistic  party will maximize its expected vote  total or 
probability  of being elected. I present here the solution without the 
random  elements  and  assuming  that the discount  factor  is zero (p. = 0). 
A straightforward  maximization  leads to the following equations (for 
even-numbered  values of t): 
(7)  ut =  ba rrt, 
(8)  ut_ I =  ba(rrt +  -rrt  1). 
Together  with equation  5, equations  7 and  8 describe  the dynamics  of 
the opportunistic  PBC. Figure  4 shows a simulation  of the inflation  rates 
for an opportunistic  cycle for both low and high initial inflation  rates 
(with  initial  annual  inflation  rates of 0 and 16  percent)  and  with high  and 
low inflation  aversions.14 The properties  of the cycle are clear. Oppor- 
tunistic parties tend toward equilibrium  (that is,  long-run average) 
inflation  and unemployment  rates, but the system tends to oscillate 
within  the election cycle. The intracycle  oscillation shows high unem- 
ployment  and declining  inflation  in the first half of the electoral period 
and  low unemployment  along  with rising  inflation  in the second half. 
It is also possible to analyze the model with random  supply shocks. 
Assume that the shocks occur each period after the policies for that 
period  have been determined.  Hence, parties set policies for period t 
and  then the shock for period t occurs. The shocks will therefore  affect 
policies only for the second half of the electoral cycle. The algebra  of 
shocks  is straightforward  and  is omitted  here. 
Figure  5 illustrates  the impact  of shocks in the opportunistic  model.  15 
For  this  example  we have taken  an  identical  sample  of shocks and  shown 
performance  is above some threshold level. She shows that, in this model, normal 
preferences  on the part  of voters may  aggregate  into  jagged  iso-vote contours  that  do not 
contain  concave  indifference  regions. 
14. For this example, parameter  values are a  =  0.8,  u*  =  6, and the optimal 
unemployment  rate = 4. The value of inflation  aversion  is b = 0.1 for the high-inflation 
trajectory  and  b = 0.4 for the low-inflation  trajectory. 
15. For  this simulation,  e, is an independent  uniform  random  variable  with a mean  of 
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Figure  4. Simulated  Inflation  Trajectories  for Opportunistic  Parties  with  Differing  Inflation 
Aversion  and Initial  Conditionsa 
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a.  The trajectories are inflation rates for the opportunistic  model.  Low  inflation aversion  represents  party L; high 
inflation aversion  represents  party C. The initial conditions  are 0 percent and 16 percent inflation rates. 
how it affects each of the four paths for the inflation  rate. The cyclical 
pattern  of policy shocks is somewhat  masked by the shocks while the 
difference  between degrees of inflation  aversion continues to show up 
strongly. 
Ideological  Cycles 
Although  opportunistic  cycles have been extensively analyzed  in the 
economic literature,  until recently there has been little modeling  of the 
ideological  approach.  16  What  follows is one approach  to the modeling  of 
dynamic  political  choice when parties  differ  in their  preferences. 
16. Most economic  analyses of the ideological  or "partisan"  approach  overlook  the 
two-way  interaction  between  economic  policies  and  political  choices. Theoretical  studies 
include  Alesina  (1987),  who analyzes  a two-party  system as a repeated  game. This model William D. Nordhaus  21 
Figure 5. Simulated  Inflation  Trajectories  for Opportunistic  Parties with Shocks and 
Differing  Inflation  Aversion  and Initial  Conditionsa 
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a.  The  assumptions  about parties  and initial conditions  are identical  to those  in figure 4.  In this  simulation,  the 
system is subjected to random inflation shocks. 
The analysis  retains  the earlier  economic model  in which the govern- 
ment  trades  off current  satisfaction  (low unemployment)  for current  and 
future  pain  (high  inflation).  In the spirit  of the earlier  analysis, the focus 
here is on parties  that show a mixture  of ideological  and opportunistic 
behavior.  The  general  specification  of the  previous  section  is analytically 
intractable,  but before simplification  it is important  to consider the 
possibility  of cyclical manipulation  by purely ideological  parties. Con- 
sider  party  competition  of the kind  analyzed  in the section on ideological 
parties,  in which two parties  are purely  ideological  and have attained  a 
assumes  that  election  outcomes  are  exogenous,  which  robs  the model  of any potential  for 
explaining  shifts  in regimes,  the interaction  of politics  and  economics,  or the evolution  of 
party  ideology.  Also see Alesina  and Rosenthal  (1989).  There  are a number  of empirical 
studies  of ideological  cycles-see,  for example, Chappell  and Keech (1988)-but most 
also take  the probabilities  of election  of different  parties  as exogenous. 22  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
stable Nash equilibrium.  Further  assume that the parties have a zero 
discount  rate  whereas  voters  are  backward-looking  and  ignore  economic 
conditions  beyond  the election. 
As I suggested earlier, even purely ideological parties will induce 
business  cycles within  the electoral  period.  Such  cycles will improve  the 
party's chances for reelection even though they would otherwise be 
undesirable  to the party.  More  generally,  as long as the electoral  system 
tends  to overdiscount  the future,  even purely  ideological  parties,  aiming 
to enhance  their  chances  of gaining  office, will want  to compromise  their 
most  preferred  position  by moving  consumption  to the period  before  the 
election.  17 
What  follows is a simple  formal  model  of ideological  parties.  As in the 
previous  section, the preference  function  of the kth  party  is represented 
as 
(9)  Wk{E[Uk(x)],Pk}  =  1[PkUk(Xk)  +  (1  -  Pk)Uk(Xi)]  +  (1  -  1)Pk, 
where the variables are as already defined except that party  j is the 
opposition  party. No simple  closed-form  function  can be used to repre- 
sent party behavior, so I parameterize  the problem  by assuming that 
equation  9 reduces  to the following  simple  quadratic  function: 
(10)  Wk =  -[Ut  +  bk  2  +  (1  +  L)  (U,1  +  bk  1t)]- 
Each party  is assumed  to maximize  equation  10  subject  to the economic 
constraint  in equation 5. Equation 10 implicitly  assumes that the two 
17. A formal proof can be seen in the following simple example. Assume a finite 
horizon  of 0 periods in which there is a fixed stock of 0 consumption  goods. Time is 
continuous,  and  elections  occur  at points  0, 1, 2,....  The ideological  party  is assumed  to 
have a zero discount  rate (4 =  0), and voters and the party  have the same preference 
function,  u(c,),  over  consumption,  c,. Consider  the policy  of a purely  ideological  party  that 
sets c, =  1. The voting function in this case is given by VT = f  [g,],  where 
gT  =  f  U(CT._)e  TdT. 
0 
Starting  at the constant consumption  trajectory,  by reallocating  a small amount of 
consumption  (Ac)  from  after  this  election  to  just before  the next election  (that  is, from  time 
T-  1  +E  to time T-E),  the probability  of election goes up byf(g)u'(1)[1  -exp(-  [)]Ac> 
O, while the party's ideological utility changes by u'(1)[1  -  l]Ac =  0. Note that this 
reallocation  does not affect future consumption  and therefore  leaves future elections 
unaffected.  This example shows that differential  discounting  produces  a political  cycle 
even for purely  ideological  parties. William D. Nordhaus  23 
parties  have identical  inflation  and  unemployment  targets,  but that  they 
differ  in their  inflation  aversion.  The inflation  aversion  of conservatives 
is higher  than  the inflation  aversion  of liberals  (that  is, bL  < bm  < bc). 
The parameter  about  which parties  differ,  bk, can be interpreted  as a 
compromise  between  the party's  genuine  inflation  aversion  and  its desire 
to win. When the party  is purely  opportunistic,  its bk  will equal that of 
the median  voter;  a purist  or superideological  party  (one concerned  only 
with its platform  and not at all with economic outcomes) will set its bk 
equal  to its preferred  level. An ideological  party  desiring  to maximize  its 
preference  in equation  10  will be somewhere  in between. In the solution 
that follows, assume that parties plan for only the current electoral 
period. 
When parties are driven by this kind of mixture of ideology and 
opportunism,  the solution path is easily found. Omitting  the random 
shocks yields 
(11)  Uk,t  =  bk alTk,t, 
(12)  Uk,t-1=  bk a(k,t  +  TFk,tt-,) 
along  with  equation  5. Note that  these equations  contain  variables  Uk(  ) 
and  lTk(  )  as  a  reminder that economic policy depends upon the 
preferences  of the parties. 
Three  points  should  be noted  about  the  behavior  of ideological  parties. 
The first is that parties now matter for economic policy. In the pure 
opportunistic  model,  the  identity  of the party  was irrelevant  for  economic 
policy; in the ideological model, parties affect economic outcomes as 
they pursue their own objectives. In the example used here, the con- 
servative  party  drives the economy toward  a long-run  equilibrium  with 
low inflation  while the liberals  steer toward  a high-inflation  equilibrium. 
Second, depending  upon the voting  function  and expectations, ideo- 
logical  parties  may  induce  considerable  instability  in  the sense of frequent 
changes  of the party  in power and therefore  of policy changes. As the 
incumbent  party succeeds in attaining  its ideological objectives, the 
economic  outcomes  increasingly  depart  from  the  preference  of a majority 
of the voters. If the voters compare performance  with an average of 
recent  economic  experience, the pure  policies of ideological  parties  will 
compare  unfavorably.  The voters will therefore  desire to change  parties 
and thereby  effect a return  toward  the middle of the preference  distri- 24  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
bution. Perhaps  the long cycles of politics described  by R. W. Emerson 
and A. M. Schlesinger  can be explained  as a reaction  to the cumulative 
effect of ideological  parties'  policies shifting  the policies of society too 
far away from  the center.  18 
Figure  6 shows the induced  cyclical behavior  of a two-party  system 
with inflation  shocks, alternating  between periods of liberal and con- 
servative policies. In this example, liberals tend to win more often 
because their policies are closer to the median  voter than are those of 
the conservatives. Some of the inherent regularities  of figure 6 are 
masked  by the shocks. In addition,  this graph  shows how the alternating 
policies of the two regimes  better satisfy the preferences  of the median 
voter  than  would  the pure  policies  of either  party  alone, a point  suggested 
earlier. 
A third  and somewhat surprising  point is a corollary  of the second: 
because of the discontinuity  of economic policy caused by changes in 
the party in power in the ideological model, the economy can display 
"chaotic"  behavior.  More  precisely,  the economy tends  to be extremely 
sensitive to small  changes  in parameters  and  initial  conditions. 
Figure  7 shows the result of four simulations  in which the economic 
structure  and the initial  conditions  are the same but party  preferences 
are slightly modified.19  These small changes induce different  electoral 
outcomes and lead to different  histories. Figure  7 shows the economic 
outcomes and the parties in power in a simulation that tracks the 
interaction  of an  unchanging  conservative  party  (identical  to that  shown 
in figure  6) and four slightly  different  liberal  parties. In this simulation, 
liberal  parties  A through  C tend to compromise  slightly  less than  liberal 
party  D. As a result,  in the third  period,  the conservatives  win  an  election 
against  liberal  party  A, B, and C, while D remains  in office by pursuing 
a slightly less liberal  policy. From period 3 on, we see that the small 
difference  in preference  leads to a discontinuously  more liberal  policy 
for party  D as compared  with the conservative replacements  for A, B, 
and  C, and  this  difference  has  not  disappeared  even after  a dozen election 
periods. Similar instabilities can surface for small changes in initial 
18. See Schlesinger  (1986)  for an entertaining  survey  of the subject. 
19. More  precisely,  in these simulations,  the inflation  aversion  factor,  bk in equations 
11  and 12,  is equal  to 0.47, 0.48, 0.49, and  0.50 in runs  A, B, C, and  D. William  D. Nordhaus  25 
Figure 6.  Simulated Inflation and Unemployment Rates for Ideological Parties with Shocksa 
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conditions. The reason for the instability is the discontinuous  nature of 
political choice: because winners take all, small changes in the structure 
or in the shocks can produce large differences in economic  outcomes. 
Ultrarational Voters and Parties 
The most  penetrating criticism  of  PBC  models  is grounded  in the 
assumption that ultrarational voters  can see  through the manipulative 
actions of parties. Unlike the two earlier models, proponents of this view 
assume that voting is forward-looking rather than retrospective  and that 
ultrarational voters both understand the structure of the economy  and 
forecast rationally the behavior of parties. 
Ultrarational voters  can be  modeled  as follows.  Voters  assess  the 26  Brookings  Paper-s  on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
Figure 7.  Instability of Outcomes with Ideological Parties and Small Changes 
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change in preferences  of parties. Differences  are explained  in text. 
"platform" of different parties according to a forward-looking  vote 
function  of the form 
(13)  Vt(ut+1,  Ut+2,.  *2  *  t  T+1 5t2,  .  ) 
-  Et(u2+1  +  RUt2+2  +  R2  Ut2+3 +  * 
+  brrT2+1 +  Rb  r2  +2  +  R2b  r2  +3  + 
where Et(.) is the expectation at time t, R = (1 + r)-'  =  a discount factor, 
and r the relevant  discount  rate. How will parties  behave in the face of 
ultrarational  voters? The simplest  case is one in which voters compare 
their  ultrarational  forecast of party  behavior  with the optimal  outcome 
and  vote for the party  whose policy is closest to the optimum.  With  pure 
opportunism  or sufficient  party  competition,  parties  will then maximize 
the  voting  function  in  equation  13  subject  to the macroeconomic  structure William  D. Nordhaus  27 
in equation  5. Some  algebra  showing  the optimal  policy  for opportunistic 
parties faced by ultrarational  voters is given by the following pair of 
equations: 
(14)  ut =  abrt  + Rut+1, 
(15)  'rt =  t-  a(ut  -  U*). 
The distinction  between the ultrarational  solution and the earlier  equa- 
tions is that  the policy equation  is forward-looking  and  follows a saddle- 
point trajectory with a steady-state solution given by u  =  u* and 
Ir =  u*(1  -R)Iab.  It is easily verified that this policy does not introduce 
any cyclical behavior  of the kind  displayed  in opportunistic  cycles. 
The solution with ideological parties is more complicated  because 
voters  cannot  impose  their  preferences  upon  parties.  The  earlier  analysis 
of ideological  parties suggests that there may be stable and divergent 
party  policies. If the parties'  and  the voters' discount  rates  are  the same, 
there  will  be no intraperiod  cycle. Put  differently,  a party  will  be rewarded 
only for approaching  the median voter's preferences and not for the 
presence  or absence of any election-year  cycles. 
Tests in the next section will rely upon  two properties  of models with 
ultrarational  voters. The first concerns voters' assessment of shocks. 
Assume for simplicity  that parties are identical  either because of con- 
vergence  or because of opportunism;  additionally,  augment  the ultrara- 
tional model with economic shocks as in equation 5. In this case, the 
optimal  policies will be 
(16)  ut =  ab Et(,t)  + REt(ut+1), 
(17)  'rt =  st-  -  a(ut  -  u*)  +  et, 
where  Et(  ) was defined  above. The response of parties  will not differ 
in the presence of external shocks. Because of ultrarationality,  voters 
will see through  the veil of the economic shocks and will not penalize 
parties. Thus ultrarationality  implies that there will be no effect of 
exogenous economic shocks on party popularity when parties are 
identical. 
A second testable property of the model with ultrarational  voters 
applies to a classical economy in which policymakers cannot affect 
unemployment  or  real  output.  In such  a world,  ultrarational  voters  would 
not  penalize  parties  during  periods  of high  unemployment  or give parties 
high  ratings  during  periods  of low unemployment. 
As a final  comparison,  figure  8 shows how the ultrarational,  oppor- 28  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Figure  8. Comparative  Trajectories  of Different  Parties  with Identical  Initial  Conditionsa 
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a.  This  figure shows  the reaction of the three different kinds of parties to an inflation shock,  where each  regime 
was originally in long-run (or limit-cycle)  equilibrium. 
tunistic, and ideological parties react to an inflationary  shock.20  The 
ultrarational  model  with opportunistic  parties  drives inflation  down in a 
smooth  way to the low long-run  equilibrium.  The other  two simulations 
show higher  levels of inflation  because of retrospective  voting, with the 
ideological  case showing  cycles both  within  and  across  electoral  periods. 
Evidence on Political Business Cycles 
While a vast literature  on PBC models has sprung  up over the past 
two decades, little agreement exists about which models are most 
applicable.  Given the  jumble  of approaches,  the purpose  of this section 
20. All three  simulations  in figure  9 have the same economic structure,  with a = 0.8. 
The inflation  aversion  is b =  0.2 for both opportunistic  solutions  while b = 0.1 for the 
liberal  party  and  0.4 for  the conservative  party.  The  discount  rate  is 0.06  percent  per  period 
for the ultrarational  solution. William  D. Nordhaus  29 
is to see whether  the disputes  can be narrowed  by an examination  of the 
historical  evidence. This section reviews in detail the two issues most 
central to evaluating  the importance  of PBC models: whether voters 
behave in accordance  with the postulate  of ultrarationality  and whether 
parties  behave opportunistically  or ideologically. 
Recall that voters are said to be ultrarational  if they have rational 
expectations,  possess all available  information,  and evaluate  parties  by 
comparing  their  expected  future  performances.  Bennett  McCallum  relied 
upon the hypothesis of ultrarationality  along with a classical model of 
the  economy  to present  the  rational-expectations  critique  of PBC  models, 
which  argues  that  "governments  cannot .  ..  manufacture  booms during 
the latter portion of  their elected terms.  "21  This line of  argument 
dampened  enthusiasm  for  research  on political  business  cycles for  almost 
a decade. 
Of a number  of possible approaches  to assessing the rational-expec- 
tations  critique  of PBC models, one especially powerful  test is whether 
voters satisfy the postulate of ultrarationality.  As it turns out, voting 
data  provide  a good laboratory  for examining  ultrarationality,  for which 
four  different  tests are examined  here. 
The data  set used for many  of the tests that  follow is from  Gallup  polls 
on presidential  performance. The data cover presidential  popularity 
polls  of approximately  1,000  people.22  They  ask the  respondents  whether 
they approve of the president's performance  generally ("general ap- 
proval"), and sometimes, but less frequently,  whether  they approve  of 
the president's management  of the economy ("economic approval"). 
Figure  9 shows the data  used for this study. Because of the bound  on the 
arithmetic  popularity,  the data were transformed  to obtain  an approval 
ratio, which measures the ratio of approval  to disapproval,  excluding 
21. McCallum  (1978,  p. 504),  emphasis  in original. 
22. It is important  to distinguish  between voting functions, which measure actual 
electoral  results,  and  popularity functions,  which  are generated  by interviews.  While  the 
former  are ultimately  crucial  in political  choices, popularity  functions  have a number  of 
significant  advantages  for studies of politico-economic  behavior.  Most important  is that 
they are available  on a monthly  basis, whereas  electoral  results  are available  only every 
two or four  years. Moreover,  popularity  data  contain  an important  statistical  advantage; 
by controlling  on the identity  of the government  leader, which is clearly an important 
factor  in  voter  attitudes,  they  allow  a more  precise  determination  of the  impact  of economic 
effects  upon  attitudes.  The major  shortcomings  of popularity  data  are  high  volatility  of the 
estimates  and  some systematic  biases. Most studies  indicate,  however,  that  modern  polls 
are  relatively  accurate  predictors  of voter  behavior.  See, for  example,  Chappell  and  Keech 
(1988). 30  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Figure 9.  Unemployment and Presidential Approval: General Performance and Economic 
Management, 1981-87 
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those with no opinion. Figure  9 also shows the unemployment  rate for 
1981-87. 
Before proceeding with formal tests, it is worth pausing for one 
preliminary  comment and one comparison  with other studies. One of 
the striking  features of both popularity  data and election returns  is the 
importance  of economic affairs  for political success. Figure 9 depicts 
the strong  impact  of the business cycle on presidential  popularity;  over 
the period 1981-87, the correlation between general and economic 
presidential  popularity  is 0.94. More  evidence  of the salience  of economic 
affairs  is that  economic variables  plus incumbency  have a correlation  of 
0.85 with the outcome of presidential  elections during  1920-88. Given 
the variety of ways in which government  influences  everyday life and 
the variety  of priorities  mentioned  in polls, it is puzzling  that economic 
events loom so large  in political  affairs. 
In addition, it is useful to compare the results of estimates of the 
popularity  function  for the 1980s  with tests for other periods  and other 
countries.  Table  2 makes  such  a comparison.  While  the data  and  methods William  D. Nordhaus  31 
Table 2.  Alternative Estimates of Impact of Economic Conditions on Government 
Popularity, Various Countries, Various Periods 
Estimated  coefficient 
Country  f 
and period  Unemployment  Inflation 
United States (1981-88)  - 8.6  -0.1 
Alternative  studies 
United States (1953-75)  -4.2  -  1.0 
United Kingdom  (1959-74)  -6.0  -0.7 
West Germany  (1951-75)  -0.9  -0.7 
Source:  Alternative  studies are surveyed  in Frey (1978). 
of the different  studies  are not identical,  they do show a strong  tendency 
for  government  popularity  to decline  with increases  in either  inflation  or 
unemployment.  However, popularity  functions for the United States 
during  the 1980s  impute  a much higher  relative cost to unemployment 
than for earlier  periods or for other countries. In addition, the strong 
relative aversion to inflation  in Germany  is apparent  in the popularity 
data. 
The first of the four tests of ultrarationality  directly confronts the 
rational-expectations  critique  of PBC  models  by testing  thejoint  hypoth- 
esis of ultrarational  voters and  a new classical structure  of the economy. 
In the previous  section, I showed that  rational  opportunistic  parties  in a 
new classical economy could not and would not manipulate  real eco- 
nomic  activity over the electoral  cycle. Any changes in unemployment 
and output  would be exogenous. Since parties  can do nothing  to affect 
unemployment  or output  in a new classical world, party  popularity  and 
election  results should  be unaffected  by cycles in the "real economy," 
that is, by changes in unemployment  or output. Since policy can still 
affect  inflation,  inflation  must  be excluded  from  the test. 
The results of the first test, shown in table 3, decisively reject the 
hypothesis  of no impact  of the  real  economy  upon  presidential  approval.23 
For each of the four regressions, the probability  that the data were 
generated  by chance  under  the null  hypothesis  lies below the lower limit 
(0.001) of my F-test table. This completely independent test of the 
23. Earlier  studies-see,  for example,  Fair  (1978)-have found  rate  of change  of real 
income  or unemployment  to have greater  explanatory  power than levels. Although  no 
exhaustive  analysis  was undertaken  for this study, popularity  appears  to respond  largely 
to the level of unemployment  rather  than  to the change. 32  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Table 3.  Tests of Relation between Voter Approval and the Real Economy, February 
1981-December 1987a 
Independent  variable 
Unemployment  Industrial  Summary  statistic 
Dependent  variableb  Constant  rate  productionc  R2  Fd  pe 
General approval  3.7  -0.27  .  ..  0.30  33.3  0.00 
(0.4)  (0.05)  (1, 77) 
General  approval  22.9  -0.48  -3.68  0.34  19.3  0.00 
(9.7)  (0.11)  (1.86)  (2, 154)  0.00 
Economic  approval  2.9  -0.23  .  .  .  0.45  22.6  0.00 
(0.4)  (0.05)  (1, 29) 
Economic approval  22.1  -0.43  -3.71  0.58  18.5  0.00 
(6.6)  (0.08)  (1.30)  (2, 154) 
a.  The real economy  refers to the variables of unemployment  rate and industrial production,  which, in the classical 
model, are unaffected by macroeconomic  policies  and should therefore have no impact on voter approval if the voter 
is ultrarational. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors unless  otherwise  noted. 
b.  Approval  is  expressed  as  the  ratio of  percent  of  respondents  approving  to  those  disapproving  of  either  the 
general or economic  performance of the president. 
c.  Industrial production enters equation as natural logs. 
d.  Numbers in parentheses  are degrees  of freedom  in numerator and denominator of F-test. 
e.  The F-test  probability that approval is not related to the real economy. 
rational-expectations  approach  leaves little statistical  doubt  of the irrel- 
evancy of that  theory  in the minds  of the voters. 
The second test involves the folk wisdom in political analysis that 
newly elected candidates  enjoy a "honeymoon"  after  they enter office, 
with high  early  levels of popularity  tending  to erode after  a few months 
as reality  deflates  the  electorate's  unrealistically  high  initial  expectations. 
A repeated  tendency of voters to overvalue  the policies of new incum- 
bents is a clear violation of ultrarationality.  After a couple of political 
marriages  have gone sour, voters should remember  their past disillu- 
sionment  and  discount  the temporary  postelection  euphoria.  Surely  their 
own past sentiments  are in the information  set of ultrarational  voters, so 
the existence of honeymoon  effects is a strong  test of ultrarationality. 
For a formal  test, I examined  the popularity  data  for the eight  postwar 
presidents.  The hypothesis  was that  popularity  moved according  to the 
following  process: 
(18)  Pt = P*  + Ht, 
where P* is "fundamental"  presidential  popularity  in month  t (where t 
is months  after  the inauguration),  and  Ht  is the amount  of the honeymoon 
effect that  has survived  t periods.  I assume  that  P* is a martingale,  while 
the honeymoon  effect moves according  to the process: William  D. Nordhaus  33 
(19)  Ht  =  Ho  exp[  -8t  +  Ej] 
where Ho is the initial honeymoon effect, 8 is the decay rate of the 
honeymoon effect (per month), and Et is an error term incorporating 
miscellaneous  factors. 
To estimate  equations 18 and 19, take the shortcut  of calculating  Ht 
by subtracting  the "fundamental  popularity"  from equation 18, where 
fundamental  popularity  is calculated  as the average popularity  for the 
entire term of office after the first year of the presidency. Taking 
logarithms  of equation  19  produces  the final  equation: 
(20)  ht= ho  -  8t  +  Et, 
where  ht  is the logarithm  of Ht. 
Figure 10 shows a plot of presidential  popularity  before being trans- 
formed  to obtain  the estimated  equation.  Table  4 displays  the estimated 
coefficients  of equation  20. Each equation  is highly  significant,  and each 
of the 16  coefficients  has the predicted  sign and is significant  at the one- 
tail, 5-percent confidence level. The results indicate the presence of 
powerful  honeymoon  effects, with  popularity  initially  boosted  by a factor 
of about  eight (which  is the antilog  of the ho  coefficient  of 2). Except for 
the Ford  collapse  after  the Nixon pardon,  the decay rates  tend  to cluster 
around  20 percent  per month. Under  this specification,  the honeymoon 
effect disappears after about  10 months (that is,  2  -  0.2T  =  zero for 
T =  1O  months). 
The  initial  honeymoon  effect is larger  for  vice-presidents  who succeed 
presidents  after  death  or political  dismemberment,  and  these high  initial 
effects  decay  at  higher-than-average  rates.  The  initial  honeymoon  effects 
appear  to decline over time, but the decay rates show no trend. In 
addition,  the decay rates are close to those estimated as the rates of 
amnesia  for economic events (see the fourth  test below). 
The formal  test concludes that the honeymoon effect is a decisive 
violation  of ultrarationality,  for it implies that trends in voter approval 
in the early part of the electoral period are predictable.  In less formal 
terms,  to paraphrase  Samuel  Johnson,  postelection euphoria,  like mar- 
riage,  is the triumph  of hope over experience.24  It is difficult  to imagine 
an  unbiased  and  efficient  method  of processing  political  information  and 
24. What  about remarriages?  Three of the four presidents  who won a second term 
enjoyed  a "second honeymoon"  -Reagan  being the exception-although the boost to 
popularity  at the beginning  of the second  term  was markedly  smaller  than  that  at the first. 34  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
Figure  10.  Honeymoon Effect: Decay of Approval Ratio  for Eight Postwar Presidents, 
First Year in Office 
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choosing among candidates  that would induce such consistently large 
and  predictable  swings in voter attitudes. 
A third  and  weaker  test of  ultrarationality  applies  to any  stable  politico- 
economic structure  and examines  whether  popularity  is a random  walk. 
Under any stable structure,  the evaluation of parties by ultrarational 
voters should  not be forecastable.  Tests of this hypothesis  are shown in 
table 5. When  prior  information  about economic conditions  is included 
(information  that  is prior  to the last poll taken  before  the current  one and 
therefore  should rationally  be incorporated  into the lagged dependent 
variable),  a statistically significant  degree of serial dependence is de- 
tected. The statistical  significance  may  be overstated,  however,  because 
sampling  error in measuring  the approval  ratio may induce serial de- 
pendence  where none exists. 
A final test concerns the memory of voters in their evaluation of 
parties. This line of reasoning begins with the observation that, in 
addition  to predictable  short  honeymoons  and  frequent  divorces, voters William D. Nordhaus  35 
Table  4. Honeymoon  Effect  in Presidential  Popularitya 
Initial honeymoon  effect  Decay rate 
President  (ho)  (8) 
Truman  4.42  0.43 
(13.4)  (10.8) 
Eisenhower  2.34  0.25 
(8.6)  (4.1) 
Kennedy  2.34  0.17 
(5.9)  (2.3) 
Johnson  2.74  0.19 
(14.9)  (5.5) 
Nixon  2.11  0.22 
(10.0)  (6.7) 
Ford  2.66  1.60 
(5.5)  (6.1) 
Carter  1.98  0.20 
(11.9)  (8.0) 
Reagan  1.74  0.39 
(3.4)  (4.9) 
a.  Results  obtained  from  equation  20  of  text.  The  initial  honeymoon  effect  and  the  dependent  variable,  the 
honeymoon  effect  after t periods,  enter as natural logs.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
appear to have extremely short memories of the past infidelities of 
politicians; that is,  the lag distribution of popularity on  economic 
variables turns out to be extremely short. In Ray Fair's work, for 
example, voters tend to respond to GNP growth over the past two 
quarters.25  Estimates  ofthe "amnesia"  factorby  Gebhard  Kirshgaessner 
find  the  decay  rate  is on the order  of 20  percent  to 25  percent  per  month.26 
Before concluding  that voters are highly irrational  in their  memories 
of past  events, however,  consider  the possibility  that  voters  are  forward- 
looking  rather  than backward-looking.27  Voters might say: "Why fret 
25. Fair  (1978). 
26. Kirshgaessner  (1985,  p. 254). 
27. More  precisely, let the popularity  function  take the form  A(L)P, = B +  C(L)x,, 
where  P, is the popularity  ratio,  x, is the set of outcomes  or economic  indicators,  A, B, and 
C  are  vectors  of coefficients,  and  L represents  a lead  and  lag  operator.  Solving  this  equation 
for  P yields  P,  =  A(L)- I [B +  C(L)x,]. For future  values of economic  variables,  assume 
that  the optimal  forecast  of x, is x, = D(L)x,.  The observed  popularity  function  will then 
be P,  =  A(L)'-I {B +  C(L) [D(L)xj,}. Note that the lag structure  on x, is a complicated 
function  of both the popularity  function  parameters  and the optimal  forecast of x,; no 
simple  conclusion  about  the rationality  or myopia  of voters' behavior  is possible  without 
further  information  about  the expectations  concerning  x,. 36  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Table 5.  F-tests for Random Walk of Approvala 
Included  independent  General  approval  Economic  approval 
variables  F-test  Probabilityb  F-test  Probabilityb 
Lagged  dependent  variable  1.11  0.16  2.01  0.05 
(1, 72)  (1, 32) 
Lagged  dependent  variable 
and prior  information  on 
Unemployment  3.37  0.01  ..  .  ..c 
(2, 138) 
Inflation  2.76  0.05  ..c 
(2, 138) 
Industrial  production  4.22  0.03  .. 
(2, 138) 
Unemployment  and 
industrial 
production  2.68  0.02  c  c 
(3, 204)  .  C..  c 
Unemployment, 
inflation,  and 
industrial production  2.68  0.015  .c.  .c. 
(4, 268) 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  change  in general  or  economic  approval.  Numbers  in parentheses  are degrees  of 
freedom  in numerator and denominator of F-test. 
b.  F-test  probability that approval follows  a random walk. 
c.  Insufficient observations. 
about yesterday's recession? What we really care about is the future, 
and our approval  represents  a reasonable  bet on the future.  There's no 
point in beating  the dead horses of the past." If voter evaluations  are 
forward-looking  forecasts, then the weights on past events may simply 
reflect  the optimal  weights  to be used  for  future  forecasts.  As an  example, 
say that voters care only about inflation  and assume that inflation  is a 
random  walk. In this case, voters would rationally  include  only current 
inflation  in their  evaluation  function. 
Figure 11 shows four alternative  ways of viewing the importance  of 
past unemployment  rates in a political context. At the top are "social 
welfare  weights," weights that  a planner  might  use in maximizing  social 
welfare  over time, equal  to the real  discount  rate  on goods and services. 
Because  the  figure  measures  time  looking  backward,  the  weights  increase 
with the time lag to reflect  a positive real interest  rate. The middle  pair 
of curves are the weights on unemployment  from two estimates of the William  D. Nordhaus  37 
Figure  11. Memory  of Unemployment  Past:  Economic,  Optimal  Forecast,  and Estimateda 
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a.  The lag distributions are estimated impacts of unemployment  upon presidential popularity over the period 1981- 
87. The four distributions correspond  to different assumptions  about expectations. 
popularity  function. One is from a Koyck distributed  lag of popularity 
on the unemployment  rate; the other uses a maximum-likelihood  esti- 
mator of the geometric decay rate in a nonlinear equation relating 
popularity  to the unemployment  rate.28  The bottom curve shows the 
optimal  forecast of unemployment  from an autoregressive  equation  of 
the unemployment  rate.29 
The issue raised  by the different  lag structures  in figure  11  is whether 
the  weights  on  unemployment  from  the  popularity  function  are  consistent 
28. More  precisely,  let popularity  be P, = o[u, + ku,1  + k2U1-2  + k31u,3  +  *  *]  + 
other  factors.  The decay factor  k can be estimated  either by maximum  likelihood  or by 
using  the Koyck  transformation  and  estimating  P, = ou, + kP,I  +  other  factors. 
29. The optimal  forecast is estimated  over the period 1950-87  and is U =  0.092 + 
1.091  U  + 0.120  U-2  -  0.103  U-3  -  0.018  U-4  -  0.045  U-5  -  0.047 U-6  -  0.032  U-7 
-  0.010 U-8 + 0.010 U-9 + 0.016 U10, where Uis the total  unemployment  rate. The R2 
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with voter ultrarationality.  There is a strong suggestion  that voters do 
not evaluate  parties  using  a forward-looking  forecast  of future  economic 
events: the actual reaction of popularity to economic events is far 
different  from  the optimal  forward-looking  forecast. On  the other  hand, 
the reaction  has far  too much  amnesia  to represent  a sensible  retrospec- 
tive evaluation  of past  events. The  two possible  interpretations,  between 
which these data cannot distinguish,  are that popularity  is a mixture  of 
forward-looking  and  retrospective  evaluations  or that voters' memories 
of past  events decay much  more  rapidly  than  normal  economic  discount- 
ing would  prescribe.  Whatever  the interpretation,  the results  are incon- 
sistent  with the hypothesis  of ultrarationality. 
There are many other possible tests  of  ultrarationality  in voter 
behavior,  but the general  conclusion  from this and other studies is that 
the assumption  of ultrarationality  cannot  withstand  a confrontation  with 
behavioral evidence. A little reflection, however, suggests that the 
ultrarational  model of the voter is highly implausible  at the outset. A 
forward-looking,  ultrarational  voter would systematically  collect data 
on the voting  records,  platforms,  policy pronouncements,  and speeches 
of all the candidates, to which would be added the volumes of expert 
opinions, econometric forecasts, scholarly monographs, and public- 
interest group ratings. Using this information  to project the outcomes 
over the indefinite  future, the voter would then vote for the party or 
office seeker with the highest  utility  score. 
In reality, such a decision process has severe shortcomings. It is 
costly to gather  and  process all  the relevant  information;  the information 
may be difficult  for many  inexpert  or illiterate  voters to understand;  and 
the platforms  may be so vague, misleading,  and internally  inconsistent 
as to yield little information  about  future  policies and economic condi- 
tions.  30 If we add  to this welter  of confusion  the infinitesimal  probability 
of an individual's  vote changing  a national  election outcome, we can 
only conclude that homo economicus would gather  no information  and 
cast no vote. 
30. One of the functions of political  parties is to provide continuity  and establish 
reputations,  thereby  allowing  voters to make choices on the basis of past behavior  and 
performance.  New parties  (or "outsiders")  might  be forced  to rely upon  pronouncements 
and platforms  more than established  parties  or candidates.  An example of the role of 
reputation  was the formation  of the U. S. Republican  party  out of the ashes of the Whig 
party,  of which  McPherson  writes:  "Because  the Republican  party  was new, its platform 
was more  important  than  usual  in American  politics." McPherson  (1988,  p. 155). William  D. Nordhaus  39 
But individuals  do vote, especially those with higher opportunity 
costs of their time, so the ultrarational  perspective must be replaced 
with a more realistic one. Voters might  choose to economize on their 
time by gathering  only readily available  information,  such as spot TV 
advertisements.  Given the uninformative  quality of many campaign 
promises,  people might  look at past  performance  and  personal  character 
as the most reliable  indicator  of future  policies and  behavior.  In light  of 
their  rudimentary  understanding  of the intricacies  of legal, political,  and 
economic structures, voters might be generally unable to distinguish 
policy shocks from external shocks and simply hold the incumbent 
government  responsible  for whatever  events transpired.3'  In short, in a 
world where voting has little economic value to the individual and 
reliable  forecasts about the future are costly to obtain, retrospective 
evaluation  of the performance  of incumbents  on the bases of simple  and 
easily understood indexes (such as unemployment,  GNP growth, or 
inflation)  might  be a reasonable  way for many voters to make political 
decisions.  32 
Ideological  and Opportunistic Parties 
A review of research on the controversy over whether parties are 
principled  or opportunistic  shows that arguments  about ideology have 
often  been wide of the mark. 
The evidence on opportunistic  cycles comes from a wide variety of 
studies. Perhaps the most persuasive is that of Edward Tufte, who 
examined  in great  detail  a wide variety  of sources and  concluded: 
The  timing  of elections influences  the rate of unemployment  and  growth  in real 
disposable  income, the short-term  management  of inflation  and  unemployment, 
the flow of transfer  payments,  the undertaking  of expansionary  or contractive 
economic  policies, and the time perspective of economic policy-making.... 
[E]conomic life vibrates with the rhythms of politics.33 
This conclusion was reinforced by the study of Bruno Frey and 
Friedrich  Schneider,  which  showed  that  presidential  popularity  responds 
31. In Paldam's  survey of voting behavior  and popularity  functions  (1981),  he finds 
strong  evidence for the "responsibility  hypothesis," which states that voters hold the 
government  responsible  for economic  and  social  outcomes. 
32. A similar  line of reasoning  is presented  in Kramer  (1971). 
33. Tufte  (1978,  p. 137). 40  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
significantly  to macroeconomic  conditions and that government  fiscal 
policy responds to both reelection proximity and the government's 
ideology.34  Kevin Maloney  and Michael  Smirlock  find "evidence of an 
attempt to use policy instruments  to guide economic activity into a 
politically  optimal  cyclical pattern.  .  .  .35 
The pattern  holds for countries other than the United States. Frey 
and Schneider  find  that  both opportunistic  and  ideological  variables  are 
significant  determinants  of government  fiscal  policy in the United King- 
dom as well, although election proximity dominates the ideological 
variables when closely contested elections draw near. Manfred  Keil 
examines  British  data  and  finds  strong  evidence for opportunistic  cycles 
in the unemployment  rate,  in  government  expenditures,  and  in monetary 
policy.36  Yoram  Ben-Porath  demonstrates  the existence of impressive 
cycles  within electoral periods for the second through the seventh 
Knesset in Israel.37 
Beginning  with the germinal  work of Hibbs, numerous  studies have 
found evidence of ideological  or "partisan"  business cycles.38  Hibbs's 
studies show a systematic tendency, particularly  for European  class- 
based parties, to pursue macroeconomic  policies broadly consistent 
with the economic  interests  and  preferences  of their  constituencies. 
In a more  recent study, Alberto  Alesina analyzes the relative  impor- 
tance of the electoral  cycle and  regime  shifts in macroeconomic  perfor- 
mance  in 12  countries  since World  War 1.39 He concludes  that  left-wing 
governments  typically begin their regimes by lowering  unemployment 
rather  than  raising  it, which  is consistent  with the ideological  rather  than 
the opportunistic  approach,  a point made  earlier  by Alesina and  Jeffrey 
Sachs.40  It should  be remarked,  however,  that  the tests are  often  sensitive 
to the exact form of the hypothesis to be tested. By Alesina's test, the 
opportunistic  PBC  fails utterly  for the United States (see his table  6). On 
34. Frey and  Schneider  (1978a). 
35. Maloney  and  Smirlock  (1981,  p. 389). Similar  conclusions  are  found  in Laney  and 
Willett  (1983)  and  in several  chapters  of Willett  (1989). 
36. Keil (1988). 
37. Ben-Porath  (1975). 
38. See especially  Hibbs  (1977). 
39. Alesina  (1989). 
40. Alesina  and  Sachs  (1987). William D. Nordhaus  41 
Table  6. Tests  of the Effect  of Opportunistic  vs. Ideological  Parties  on Growth  in 
Federal  Transfer  Paymentsa 
Opportunistic 
variableb  Ideological variablec 
Sample  period  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
1951:1-1988:1  0.0043  0.16  0.0095  0.20 
(1.40)  (1.27) 
1951:1-1988:  1  d  0.0027  0.37  0.0094  0.18 
(Nixon years excluded)  (0.89)  (1.34) 
1969:1-1974:2  0.0161  0.16  ...  ... 
(1.45) 
a.  The dependent variable is the rate of growth of federal transfer payments divided by the CPI, corrected for the 
cycle  to remove  the impact of the business  cycle  on automatic transfers.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  The opportunistic  variable takes  the values  of  - 1  for the first year,  0 for the next two  years,  and  + 1 for the 
fourth year. 
c.  The ideological  variable takes the value of Truman =  1.0, Eisenhower  =  0.3,  Kennedy  =  0.8, Johnson  =  1.0, 
Nixon  =  0.5,  Ford  =  0.3,  Carter  =  0.5,  and Reagan  =  0.0. 
d.  Sample period excludes  1969:1-1974:2. 
the other  hand,  the opportunistic  model  should  apply  with  greatest  force 
to presidential  reelections-the  only opportunity  that parties have to 
advance  their  own popularity  by economic policy. During  the past three 
decades, there were but two observations  (1969-72 and 1981-84), and 
they both  exhibited  the bust-and-boom  cycle predicted  by the opportun- 
istic model. 
On reflecting  upon the debate about party motivation,  one is led to 
conclude that it is a mistake to propound  a unique and monocausal 
"correct" model to explain the behavior of such a complex system. 
Political  cycles reflect  a wide variety of party  behavior-ideological or 
opportunistic  or both or neither-depending upon the electoral regime 
and  individual  personalities.  Political  power bestows room  for substan- 
tial discretion by leaders and thus for diverse patterns of behavior. 
Unlike competitive firms, individual  parties and leaders have ample 
room  to be venal or farsighted,  partisan  or patriotic. 
A second point, which has already  been made, is that the ideological 
model is sometimes  misspecified.  Purely  ideological  parties  will find it 
advantageous  to move toward  the center so that they can survive long 
enough  to implement  their  policies. 
Another  issue concerns potential conflicts within parties. If parties 
look beyond the next election, they may move toward what I have 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
described as the ultrarational  solution. Incumbents will then feel a 
tension between what is good for themselves and what is good for the 
party. By undertaking  short-run  maximizing  strategies, an incumbent 
may improve his own reelection chances at the expense of future 
candidates  of his party. Indeed, Morris  Fiorina  sees this as a possible 
interpretation  of the 1972  Nixon campaign: 
A party  could  find  itself  trading  off its long-term  positive  image  and  its committed 
adherents  for an ephemeral  and certain vote gain. .  .  . Richard  Nixon's 1972 
presidential  campaign  is perhaps  a case in point. [Perhaps]  the PBC chickens 
eventually  came home  to roost . ..  for Nixon's Republican  Party  in 1974.41 
This  example  suggests  a different  kind  of political  cycle depending  upon 
the strength  of loyalty of incumbents  or candidates  to their  party. 
A final  difficulty  with ideological  models is the identification  problem 
that arises in empirical studies: how do you tell the dancer from the 
dance? More precisely, the opportunistic  model predicts changes in 
economic variables  within a given electoral period, whereas the ideo- 
logical model predicts  changes conditional  on regime  changes. But it is 
exactly in cases where parties are ideological-that  is, where voters 
know with confidence  what parties  stand  for-that  the regime  change  is 
likely to reflect  a change  in voter priorities  and  that  the parties  may be a 
handmaiden  rather  than  a master  of political  change. 
This observation  may help explain  why Republican  presidents  often 
begin  their  tenure  with a recession while Democrats  start  by expanding 
the economy. To illustrate, consider the ideological model in which 
party L  has low inflation aversion while party C has high inflation 
aversion, and further  assume that there are random  exogenous shocks 
to inflation  or unemployment.  A large  contractionary  shock will lead to 
the election of party  L, which will lower unemployment;  a large infla- 
tionary  shock will lead to the election of party  C, which  will contract  the 
economy. In fact, the same  pattern  of policy response  would  occur even 
if the parties had identical preferences and were nonideological.  The 
major difference introduced by ideology is that parties specialize in 
different  policies. Just  as you go to dentists  to get your  teeth drilled,  you 
go to conservatives to root out inflation.  The pattern  will follow the 
predictions  of the ideological  model even though  the causal mechanism 
is external  shocks. 
41.  Fiorina (1981, p. 99). William  D. Nordhaus  43 
Do Political Cycles Exist? 
Having  reviewed  the major  controversies,  I conclude  with the central 
question.  Do political  business cycles exist, or are they but a statistical 
illusion  like the decolletages  or head-and-shoulders  that chartists  see in 
the stock market?  In this section I review the evidence on fiscal policy, 
monetary  policy, and  the behavior  of economic aggregates. 
Fiscal  Policy 
Because fiscal policy is under political control and directly affects 
voter well-being,  the setting  of fiscal policy is the first  place to look for 
telltale  signs of political  behavior. 
Although  the U.S. record  has been surveyed in a number  of studies 
and memoirs,  only one indelible  mark  of a political  business cycle has 
been found-the  1972 election.42  Herbert Stein, chairman  of Nixon's 
Council of Economic Advisers during  the reelection campaign,  wrote 
that  economic  policy during  this period, and  particularly  the price-wage 
controls, were adopted because the administration  felt it "could not 
enter  the active period  of the 1972  election with an economic  policy that 
was not working  and  that did not utilize all measures  that  might  make  it 
work.  " 43  Edward  Tufte presents a long catalogue  of measures  taken  by 
the Nixon administration  to enhance  its election prospects.44 
By contrast,  the 1960  and 1980  elections were marked  by presidential 
decisions  to ignore  the political  business  cycle and  refrain  from  economic 
stimulation.  Eisenhower  was informed  that a downturn  just before the 
election  was possible,  but  he was reluctant  to act  unless  a major  recession 
was threatening.  Nixon later attributed  his 1960 defeat in part to the 
weak  economic  performance  (and  studies  of Ray Fair  and  others  tend to 
corroborate  his view).45  During 1980, faced with double-digit  inflation 
42. Particularly  useful  are Stein (1978  and 1984);  Tufte  (1978);  and  Okun  (1970).  One 
missing  element  is a careful  review  of the 1984  reelection  campaign. 
43. Stein  (1978,  p. 156). 
44. A not-so-subtle  example  came with the social security  benefit  checks of October 
1972.  These  arrived  shortly  before  election  day  with  a note announcing  a 20  percent  benefit 
increase  that  was "signed  into  law by President  Richard  Nixon." Tufte  (1978,  p. 32). 
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and the widespread  perception  that inflation  was the nation's premier 
economic  problem,  Carter  chose a stance  of fiscal  and  monetary  restraint 
along  with  an  incomes  policy. Ironically,  Carter's  self-denial  was doubly 
beneficial  to Reagan:  the 1980  Reagan  victory was produced  by the high 
misery  index in 1980,  while Carter's  austerity  program  reduced  inflation 
and set the stage for the rapid expansion that guaranteed  the Reagan 
reelection  in 1984. 
Other  elections pose greater  ambiguities.  In 1964  and 1984, incum- 
bents enjoyed  rapid,  noninflationary  growth. In neither  case, however, 
is there solid evidence that economic policy was consciously designed 
to produce  a politically  advantageous  growth  path. On the other hand, 
the Johnson and Reagan administrations  were surely aware of the 
political  perils of recession and were delighted  to ride the election-year 
boom. 
To go beyond the selective memory of memoirs, I present some 
formal evidence on the cyclical pattern of both taxes and transfers. 
According to the opportunistic  PBC, taxes should be raised at the 
beginning  of the electoral period, while benefits should be raised close 
to election day. The movement  of the social security  tax rate during  the 
1960s  and 1970s  does closely conform  to this prediction.  During 1965- 
77 taxes were increased in the year after elections for four straight 
biennial  elections and  were not increased  in the year  before  elections for 
four straight elections. This pattern, it  should be  noted, occurred 
primarily  during  the Nixon years. 
A test of the role of systematic  political  factors in transfer  payments 
for both the opportunistic  and ideological  models is provided  in table 6. 
For the estimates reported  in this table, I have constructed  a series on 
the growth  of inflation-corrected  federal  personal  transfer  payments. I 
then estimate the impact of an ideological variable (going from 0 for 
conservative to 1 for liberal administrations)  along with an electoral 
cycle variable  (that takes the value of -  1 after elections and 1 before 
elections). 
The results indicate that both variables have the correct sign but 
explain  only a small  fraction  of the movement  in transfers.  In addition, 
the results are sensitive to the sample period: if the Nixon years are 
excluded, the ideological variable  changes little but the opportunistic 
variable  drops markedly.  Although  the opportunistic  variable  is more 
significant  than  the ideological  variable,  both variables  make  but a small 
contribution  to explaining  the growth  of transfer  payments. William  D. Nordhaus  45 
Monetary Policy 
Another interesting set of studies investigates the behavior of the 
Federal  Reserve. Although  nominally  independent,  the Federal  Reserve 
can be induced to accede to executive branch policies directly by 
appointments  and indirectly  by political  persuasion. A recent study of 
monetary  policy by Donald  Kettl  finds  that, notwithstanding  its vaunted 
independence, the Federal Reserve has conformed to a considerable 
degree to presidential  policy. His account of the postwar  history finds 
one election (1972)  in which  the Federal  Reserve succumbed  to political 
pressure for an easy monetary policy, but it also finds at least two 
elections (1956 and 1980) in which the Federal Reserve incurred  the 
displeasure  of incumbent  presidents.46 
Studies  by Nathaniel  Beck and  by Henry  Chappell  and  William  Keech 
find little evidence that the Federal Reserve helped reelect the incum- 
bents but substantial  evidence of "bending  with the political winds," 
that is, of adopting  the economic goals of the incumbent  president.47  A 
contrary  finding  is that  of Kevin Grier,  who finds  evidence of a four-year 
electoral  cycle having  an influence  on monetary  policy.48 
An alternative  approach  to investigating  the role of monetary  policy 
over the electoral cycle is to examine changes in the Federal Reserve 
discount  rate, a highly  visible and direct  policy instrument.  Changes  in 
the discount  rate often assume a symbolic  role, as in December 1965  or 
October 1979,  when the Federal Reserve changed  the discount rate to 
signal  a sharp  change  in policy. 
To search  for political influences, I divided the electoral cycle from 
1946  through  1988  into five periods: the month after the election, the 
next 41 months, and three subperiods in the six months before the 
presidential  election. According  to table 7, which charts  the changes in 
the  discount  rate  during  this  period,  there  does not appear  to be an  active 
election bias of the Federal  Reserve in favor of either incumbents  or a 
particular  party. The number  of discount rate increases and decreases 
before  or after  elections is roughly  equal. The hypothesis  of incumbent 
or party  bias on the part  of the Federal  Reserve in changing  the discount 
rate  can be rejected. 
46. See Kettl  (1986,  pp. 121-29). 
47. Beck  (1984);  Chappell  and  Keech  (1988). 
48. Grier  (1987). COd 
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On  the other  hand,  these data  clearly  demonstrate  a foxhole mentality: 
the Federal  Reserve keeps its head  down near  election day. A review of 
the record finds the astounding  fact that, since the Federal Reserve 
opened its doors in 1914, the discount rate has never been changed  in 
the month before a presidential  election. The data clearly indicate a 
tendency to postpone discount  rate changes-both  up and down-until 
after the election. A formal  analysis-of-variance  test of the probability 
that no changes in the discount rate occur the month  before the presi- 
dential  election and that at least four occur the month after, assuming 
that the probability  of a change is binomial  and equal in every month, 
indicates  that  the  threshold  probability  of such  a  pattern  is only 7 percent. 
To sum up, there  is little evidence that  the Federal  Reserve supports 
the electoral  prospects of incumbents,  although  it tends to move in the 
general  direction  of presidential  policy. It also tends to keep out of the 
cross fire  when presidential  campaigns  are being  waged. 
Behavior  of Aggregates 
The real proof of the pudding  is in relating  ultimate  macroeconomic 
variables  like output,  inflation,  and  unemployment  to political  behavior. 
A simple  modification  of a test originally  proposed  by McCallum  fits 
the unemployment  rate to both opportunistic  and ideological  variables 
and allows for inflation  shocks. This equation  includes a variable  for a 
president's  ideology (Liblab),  ranging  from  0 for most conservative  to 1 
for most liberal.49  In addition, it includes an opportunistic  variable 
(Elcyc)  that  is explained  in table 6. Finally, to incorporate  the impact  of 
inflation  shocks, linear  and quadratic  terms  in the rate  of inflation  of the 
GNP deflator (r)  are added. The estimated equation, including an 
autoregressive  error,  p(l), is 
[U, -  U,]  =  constant  + 0.44 Elcyc  -  0.30 Liblab 
(2.0)  (0.8) 
+  0.87rr_,  +  0.10r12_I  +  0.88 p(1), 
(2.7)  (3.8) 
R2  0.94; SEE = 0.35, 
49. The  ideological  variable  is described  in table  6. 48  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
with t-statistics  in parentheses.  The opportunistic  variable  is both  larger 
and more significant than the ideological variable, and inflation is 
extremely  important.  Figure 12 shows the forecast and actual  value for 
unemployment  for the equation  without the autoregressive  error  over 
the  period  1954-88.  The  predicted  series  tracks  the  actual  rate  reasonably 
well and  captures  all  the major  turning  points. According  to this  equation, 
major  forecast  errors  occur  in 1982,  when  the Volcker-Reagan  recession 
was deeper than the theory predicted,  and in 1967-68, when a forecast 
cycle did not occur. But for the rest of the period, the model performs 
remarkably  well. 
A Self-Correcting  Mechanism? 
A review of the evidence finds a rich array of possible linkages 
between macroeconomics  and politics and a wide variety of cycles in 
different  times and places. Depending  upon the country, the period of 
time, and the analyst, virtually  every PBC species described  in table 1 
appears  to have been identified. 
On reflection,  it is not surprising  to see a variety of cycles. Politics, 
after all, is constantly evolving. An obviously manipulative  economic 
policy, for example, will elicit political reforms  that ultimately  control 
it. In reaction to the manipulative  1972 Nixon reelection campaign, 
Congress  took steps to impede  future  attempts  to manipulate  the econ- 
omy  for  partisan  purposes.  The 1974  Budget  Act imposed  arigid  timetable 
on fiscal  policy, established  the Congressional  Budget  Office  to provide 
independent economic advice, and removed executive authority to 
rescind or impound  appropriations.  Similarly,  in the wake of criticism 
of the Federal  Reserve's expansionary  policies in 1972,  Congress  pulled 
the Federal Reserve closer to the legislative orbit by requiring  regular 
reporting  and setting  of monetary  targets  in 1975  and by establishing  a 
framework  for monetary  policy in the Humphrey-Hawkins  Act of 1977. 
Similarly,  reforms  of the social security  system incorporated  automatic 
cost-of-living  escalation  in 1972  so as to remove  the necessity  for  periodic 
benefit  adjustment.  Finally,  presidential  authority  to impose wage-and- 
price controls, which had allowed the Nixon administration  to slow 
inflation  without a recession in 1971, lapsed, and Congress refused to 
renew it in 1977.  By the end of the 1970s,  then, it would prove difficult 
for an administration  to undertake  wholesale manipulation  of economic 
policy like that  of the early 1970s. William D. Nordhaus  49 
Figure 12.  Actual and Predicted Unemployment Rate for Combined 
Opportunistic-Ideological Model,  1954-88ga 
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and Discussion 
Alberto  Alesina: The goal  of William  Nordhaus's  paper  is twofold:  first, 
to review some of the existing theoretical  models of political business 
cycles and propose ways of integrating  some of them, and, second, to 
review the available  empirical  evidence and perform  several new tests 
to evaluate  these different  models empirically. 
Nordhaus  emphasizes  that no simple  monocausal  model can capture 
the complex reality  of political  business cycles, and  I completely  agree. 
However, it is fair to say that the paper  pushes two main  conclusions: 
voters are not rational  and should  not be modeled  as such, and partisan 
effects are of secondary  importance  relative  to opportunistic  behavior. 
These two elements, naive voters and the opportunistic  behavior  of 
parties,  are  the basic ingredients  of Nordhaus's  groundbreaking  piece in 
1975.  I would like to offer a different  perspective. In particular  I would 
argue  that, for both theoretical  and empirical  reasons, models based on 
the notion  of rationality  should  not be dismissed.  I also disagree  with  the 
emphasis put on opportunistic  behavior  relative to partisan  behavior, 
and I would suggest a different  way to integrate  the two. I shall try to 
summarize  my argument  in four  points. 
First, Nordhaus makes a distinction  between models with ultrara- 
tional  voters and  those with  subrational  voters. Ultrarational  voters not 
only are rational  in the usual sense of the word as used by economists, 
but have the same information  as the parties; thus, in particular,  they 
know as much  as the parties  do about  the parties'  preferences  and  about 
the state of the economy. Subrational  voters are all the rest. A much 
more illuminating  distinction would be between voters' rationality, 
possibly without  full information,  and subrationality.  Voters are likely 
to be misinformed  and may have little incentive to gather  information, 
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but that does not mean that they do not act rationally  based upon the 
information  they have. In other  words, voters are probably  not ultrara- 
tional  as defined  in this  paper.  But  an  important  question  is the following: 
should  we model them as rational  but not perfectly informed  agents or 
as naive agents, acting  according  to simple  rules of thumb,  who can be 
easily manipulated  by politicians?  Since the paper  does not focus on this 
distinction,  it does not answer  this question. 
In fact, some interesting  theoretical  developments  in this area have 
been based precisely upon this assumption  of rational  but imperfectly 
informed  voters. These models  not only are  interesting  theoretically  but, 
as I will argue later, have had some success empirically.  In fact, the 
literature  on "rational political economics" has flourished  in recent 
years. I would have devoted more space in this paper  to an assessment 
of its contributions. 
My second point  is that  two rational  business  cycle models  have been 
recently  proposed,  one with  opportunistic  parties,  the  other  with  partisan 
parties.  The former,  developed by Kenneth  Rogoff and Anne Sibert, is 
based on the assumption  that  voters are imperfectly  informed  about  the 
competence of politicians.  ' In trying  to look as competent  as possible, 
politicians  engage in activities that resemble some of the predictions  of 
the original Nordhaus model. However, there are some interesting 
differences: in Rogoff and Sibert's model, political business cycles 
should  be much  more  short-lived  than  in Nordhaus's  model;  they should 
be concentrated  on certain  policy instruments  such as transfers,  taxes, 
or monetary  policy, but not necessarily  appear  in four-year  unemploy- 
ment  or GNP  cycles. Rogoff's  political  business  cycles are  not supposed 
to occur in every election, while the model with nonrational  voters 
predicts  much  more  regular  four-year  cycles on inflation  and  unemploy- 
ment and a much more regular and evident manipulation  of policy 
instruments. 
For the case of partisan  parties  I have proposed  a model based upon 
the Fischer  wage contracting  model.2  In this model  voters and  economic 
agents  are rational  except that they do not have enough information  to 
predict with certainty the electoral outcome. The uncertainty  about 
future partisan  policies generates expectation uncertainty  about eco- 
1.  See Rogoff (1987); Rogoff and Sibert (1988). 
2.  Alesina (1987). 52  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
nomic  variables  that can generate  business fluctuations.  The difference 
between this model  and  the partisan  model by Hibbs that  is reviewed in 
Nordhaus's paper is that partisan  effects on real variables are short- 
lived and that they disappear  once expectations adjust  to a new policy 
regime.  This model  thus implies  transitory  partisan  effects. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, these models have enjoyed 
considerably  more  empirical  success than  their  predecessors.3 
Third, Nordhaus  presents convincing evidence to show that voters 
are not ultrarational.  I readily agree. But, again, they may not be so 
naive and easily manipulated.  On the contrary, in the aggregate  they 
may be voting as rationally  as they can, given the information  that is 
available.  I do not think  that the evidence presented  sheds light on this 
question. 
For  instance,  the first  piece of evidence  is that  voters  are  retrospective 
in their evaluation  of the incumbent:  that is, they judge how well the 
incumbent  is doing based upon the current  and lagged performance  of 
the economy. This behavior can be easily predicted in a model with 
rational but imperfectly informed voters. Several models with this 
implication  have in fact been recently  developed.4 
Second, Nordhaus  argues  that  the existence of a honeymoon  effect is 
inconsistent  with ultrarationality.  This is not necessarily  so. Consider  a 
model with unknown  and stochastic "competence" along the lines of 
those proposed  by Rogoff  and Sibert.  In that model voters choose what 
they think (with limited  information)  is the most competent  candidate. 
At the time of the election they think that they have made the best 
rational  choice. Afterwards  the "true" level of competency  is learned. 
More generally,  I think  that it is very difficult  to answer  directly  the 
question  of whether  voters are plain  naive or  just imperfectly  informed. 
Perhaps  a more constructive  way to address  this question is to look at 
whether rational  models are a better guide to interpret  the empirical 
evidence than the nonrational  models. This leads me to the fourth  and 
last point, the empirical  evidence on political  business cycles. 
The  original  political  business  cycle model  of Nordhaus  and  followers 
has implications  for both  policy instruments  (monetary  and  fiscal  policy) 
and  outcomes (output  and  unemployment). 
3. Alesina  (1988). 
4.  For instance, Cukiermann  and Meltzer (1986);  Alesina and Cukiermann  (1987); 
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In the paper,  Nordhaus,  in accordance  with the literature,  finds  some 
evidence of electoral  manipulation  of monetary  and fiscal policy instru- 
ments. I consider this evidence quite suggestive and interesting. It 
implies that this kind of manipulation  occurs occasionally, but not 
always, and that it is not often easy to pin down. There exist some 
obvious cases of manipulation,  such as the 1972  election and perhaps  a 
few others, but in general  the significance  of the statistical  results in the 
literature  depends upon the sample period, even though  clearly some- 
thing  is there in one form  or another.  Perhaps  the evidence on transfers 
and  taxes is the strongest. 
My question  is then  the following:  if voters  are  so naive  and  the parties 
are so opportunistic,  shouldn't we observe a much more pronounced 
electoral  manipulation  of policy instruments,  particularly  of those under 
the direct  control  of the incumbent?  I think  that  the answer  is that if the 
manipulation  became  excessive, the  New  York  Times would  start  writing 
about  it and  that  it would become counterproductive  for the incumbent. 
Also, the opposition  party  might  use all  its available  means  of propaganda 
to damage  the image of the incumbent.  There is a limit to what can be 
done. In any case, these are exactly the basic arguments  underlying  the 
rational  models,  which  in  fact  would  predict  more  limited  and  less regular 
manipulation  of policy instruments. 
A further implication of the rational approach to  macropolitical 
economics is that the relationship between policy instruments and 
outcomes is not as predictable  and close as in the prerational  literature 
based  on a fully exploitable  Phillips  curve. My view of the literature  on 
the subject  is that the evidence of an opportunistic  cycle on output  and 
unemployment  is very weak for both the United States and OECD 
democracies.  Rejections  of the opportunistic  business cycle model are 
presented  not only in the work of mine to which Nordhaus  refers, but 
also in work by Hibbs, McCallum, and Golden and Poterba for the 
United  States  and  Paldam  for OECD  democracies.5  On  the contrary,  the 
evidence  of partisan  behavior  is much  more  encouraging  for the theory. 
Consider  table 1. All the postwar Republican  administrations,  with 
the exception of the second Reagan administration,  started with a 
recession. The average rate of growth in the first half of Republican 
administrations  (1.4 percent) has been much lower than the sample 
5.  See Hibbs (1987); McCallum (1978); Golden and Poterba (1980); Paldam (1978). 54  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Table 1. Rate  of Growth  of Real GNP 
Percent 
Year 
Administration  First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Democrats 
Truman  0.0  8.5  10.3  3.9 
Kennedy/Johnson  2.6  5.3  4.1  5.3 
Johnson  5.8  5.8  2.9  4.1 
Carter  4.7  5.3  2.5  -0.2a 
Average  3.3  6.2  5.0  3.3 
Republicans 
Eisenhower  I  4.0  -  1.3  5.6  2.1 
Eisenhower  II  1.7  -0.8  5.8  2.2 
Nixon  2.4  -0.3  2.8  5.0 
Nixon/Ford  5.2  -0.5  - 1.3a  4.9 
Reagan  I  1.9  -2.5  3.6  6.4 
Reagan  II  3.4  2.8  3.4  4.6 
Average  3.1  -0.4  3.3  4.2 
Source:  Economic  Report of tile Presidetnt, 1989, and Suirvey of Cirrentt Biusitness, November  1989, table  1-6. 
a.  Oil shocks. 
average. The second halves of Republican  and Democratic  administra- 
tions (3.7 percent  and  4.1 percent, respectively)  have been quite similar 
and close  to average while the first halves of the few Democratic 
administrations  (4.8  percent)  exhibit  a rate  of growth  higher  than  average. 
There are three ways of looking at this table. One is to say that the 
economic cycle has nothing  to do with elections. The second is that the 
opportunistic  cycle is the most important  mechanism at work but it 
appears  to be working  only with Republic  administrations.  The third  is 
that  there  are systematic  partisan  effects, but  that  they are  concentrated 
at the beginning  of new administrations  and  they disappear  because of a 
short-run  Phillips  curve. I have argued  elsewhere in favor of the third 
hypothesis.6  Let us now consider  unemployment.  Nordhaus  refers to a 
paper  by McCallum  in which he runs  regressions  like the following  one 
on quarterly  data  (sample:  1969:1-1987:4): 
,=O0.04 +  1.71  u,_  -  0.97 at-2 + 0.19 Ut-3 
(1.17) (21.51)  (-6.90)  (2.41) 
-  0.01  Elcyc, 
(-1.26) 
R2  =  0.95, 
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where u, is the difference  between official  unemployment  and Gordon's 
natural  rate of unemployment.  (Obviously McCallum  had a different 
sample since his was a 1978  paper.) Elcyc is a dummy capturing  the 
opportunistic  cycle: it assumes the value of zero in the first  half of each 
administration  and increases  linearly  in the second halves. Numbers  in 
parentheses  are t-statistics:  the electoral dummy has the correct sign 
and  is borderline  significant. 
However, suppose that you allow for short-run  partisan  effects after 
the election (as implied  by a partisan  theory  with rational  expectations) 
by running  the following  regressions: 
=  0.00 +  1.63  u,_  1 -  0.88 u,_2 +  0.20 u,_3 
(0.07) (20.16)  (-6.41)  (2.54) 
-  0.03 DD1t_1 +  0.06 RR1t1  -  0.006Elcyc, 
(-1.27)  (2.35)  (-0.44) 
R2 = 0.97. 
The dummies  DD1 and RR1 assume values different  from zero only in 
the  first  half  of Democratic  and  Republican  administrations;  they capture 
the idea of a "partisan  shock" starting  one quarter  after an election.7 
Temporary  partisan  effects are  fairly  significant,  while the opportunistic 
dummy  is insignificant. 
If one considers  only the U.S. evidence, the degrees of freedom  are 
very scarce. Evidence from other countries, however, verifies that the 
pattern  displayed  in the table is not the exception but, if anything,  the 
rule:  these short-run  partisan  effects are not uncommon.  Three recent 
papers  have made  this point, using  different  techniques  and  data sets.8 
This international  evidence shows, I believe, that one of the most 
common patterns of politico-economic cycles  is  as follows.  When 
conservative  governments  are  elected, they tend  to take  care  of inflation, 
particularly  if they have inherited  a high inflation  rate. After an early 
recession or slowdown, the economy recovers, often with a relatively 
low inflation.  In accordance  with  the opportunistic  model, these govern- 
ments  do not do anything  before the next election to "rock the boat." 
When left-wing  governments  are elected, they try to expand because 
they care  more  about  unemployment,  and  this is their  mandate  from  the 
electorate.  They  succeed  for some time  in  promoting  higher  than  average 
7.  These dummies are the same ones I used in Alesina (1988). 
8.  Alt (1985); Paldam (1989); Alesina (1989). 56  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
growth.  Then  they often run  into an inflation  problem  and  face a Phillips 
curve  becoming  steeper  and  steeper  because  expectations  adjust.  As the 
next election approaches, the economy is returning  to some kind of 
average  growth,  and  inflation  is relatively  high. At this point, in order  to 
please the electorate  and  be reelected, left-wing  governments  may have 
to fight  inflation,  which has become the number  one cause of concern. 
Opportunistic  behavior  for left-wing  governments  may actually be the 
opposite of that prescribed  by the traditional  model. Examples of this 
kind of behavior  of the left include the Carter  administration,  the first 
government under the French socialists (1981-86), and the German 
social democrats in the late seventies and early eighties. The most 
obvious examples on the right  are the first administration  of President 
Reagan  and  the first  government  of Mrs. Thatcher. 
In summary,  I believe that the empirical  evidence on the politico- 
economic cycle broadly  viewed suggests two conclusions. The first is 
that temporary  partisan  effects on output  and unemployment  are more 
common than the opportunistic  cycle allows. Second, opportunistic 
manipulation  of policy instruments  is sometimes but not always ob- 
served. Both these observations  are consistent with the implication  of 
recent  rational  politico-economic  models. 
In any case, despite these disagreements  on some aspects of the 
paper, I greatly enjoyed it and completely agree with its premise that 
political cycles of various kinds exist and are here to stay. I am very 
pleased that William  Nordhaus has chosen to return  to a field that he 
opened  fifteen  years ago. 
Charles L. Schultze: I liked this paper. I think its particular  strength 
lies in the way Nordhaus  combines  ideological  and  opportunistic  behav- 
ior of the two political parties. Nordhaus  identifies  and nicely models 
two  different  ways in  which  parties  or  candidates  may  modify  ideological 
preferences to fit voter preferences. First, his equations allow some 
weight  for the traditional  role of sheer  opportunism-the desire  to wield 
power. But, second, since parties  have to gain power to see their  goals 
realized,  even the purely  ideological  aspects of their  welfare  maximizing 
are contaminated  with calculations  of voter preference.  Nordhaus  also 
provides  us, in his table 1, with a highly  useful  taxonomy  to help sort  out 
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business cycles.  And, finally, I thought he did a convincing job in 
disposing  of the notion  that  voters are ultrarational. 
I want to do several  things  in this comment. First, to add a few more 
pounds  of empirical  flesh  to the body of the Nordhaus  paper.  Second, to 
supplement  Nordhaus's two components of party behavior-ideology 
and opportunism-with a third  component-namely,  systematic  differ- 
ences in the economic models used by the two parties. 
Let me start  with  the data  in  my own table 1,  which  has some similarity 
to Alberto Alesina's table. On the surface, at least, table 1 provides 
striking  evidence for the influence  of both political  ideology and oppor- 
tunism  in the business cycle. 
The first  column  shows the change  in the GNP gap-the  gap between 
actual GNP and potential GNP-in  the first eight quarters  of every 
presidential  term since 1948. The first two years of the first term of 
Republican  administrations  are  always  accompanied  by large  reductions 
in GNP relative  to its potential. And in two out of three cases, the first 
two years of the second  term of Republican  administrations  have the 
same  characteristic.  (The  first  two years  of Reagan's  second  term  provide 
the only exception.) 
In the first two years of every term of a Democratic  administration 
(whether  first or second), the reverse occurs; GNP expands sharply 
relative  to potential.  Parties  thus appear  to be highly  ideological  in their 
first  two years in office. This insight,  of course, is not new and was, for 
example, a central feature of the recent Alesina-Sachs model of the 
political  business  cycle. 
The fifth  column shows the behavior  of the GNP gap in the second 
eight  quarters  of presidential  terms. The last two years of both terms  of 
administrations  of both political  parties  are usually  characterized  either 
by strong economic expansion or, in the case of Kennedy-Johnson, 
1966-68,  by the maintenance  of an already  high level of activity. There 
are three exceptions. In the second two years of Eisenhower's second 
term  the GNP gap, already  negative, fell further  (the aborted  recovery 
of 1959).  This  observation  is the real  outlier.  The  last two years  of Nixon- 
Ford, 1974-76, and Carter, 1978-79, in which the GNP gap declined, 
can  be explained  by the effects of the two oil shocks. There  is, then, only 
one real  anomaly,  the last two years of Eisenhower's  second term. 
In short, with one major exception, and subject to the effect of 
exogenous shocks, during  the two years before elections the economy 3  .  Q  D  o 
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behaved  in a way that  was consistent  with opportunistic  behavior  by the 
parties, acting  on the assumption  that voters care mainly  about recent 
events. 
Things are, in fact,  not that simple. Look closely  at the initial 
conditions  facing  each new administration  in its first  term-the  second, 
third,  and  fourth  columns  of the table. Every new Republican  adminis- 
tration  entered office following a recent acceleration  of inflation,  and, 
with one exception, in an economy operating  above its potential. (The 
exception was Reagan's  first term, in 1981;  but even though  GNP was 
then well below potential, inflation  was running  at 11 percent and had 
been accelerating  sharply.)  However opportunistic  they might  be, Dem- 
ocratic administrations  had, by the end of their second terms, pushed 
the economy well into the accelerating  inflation  zone, which not only 
hurt  them politically  but put their Republican  successors in the catbird 
seat  in  terms  of having  a good  reason  to pursue  the Republican  ideological 
preference  for suppressing  inflation:  there was, in fact, a substantial 
inflation  to suppress.1 
All incoming  Democratic  administrations  faced  the opposite  problem; 
they inherited  an economy operating  well below potential, with high 
unemployment  and  an inflation  rate  that  had  recently  been decelerating. 
Their  Republican  predecessors had, by the end of their second terms, 
left the economy with substantial  unemployment,  probably  well above 
their own ideological preferences, even before adjusting  for election- 
year  opportunism.  The  only exception  was at the end  of Ronald  Reagan's 
second term, by which time traditional  Republican  ideology had been 
replaced  by Reaganomics. 
In Nordhaus's  model it is hard  to explain  these results. It is possible, 
as I noted,  to explain  the deterioration  of GNP in the pre-election  period 
under Nixon-Ford in 1976 and Carter  in 1980 by the oil shocks. But 
otherwise  it is not possible to explain the electorally unfavorable  state 
of the economy at the end of each party's eight-year tenure-high 
inflation  with Democrats, high unemployment  with the Republicans- 
by exogenous  shocks. Even parties  that were highly  ideological,  giving 
1. The inflation  measure  is the GNP deflator.  In the last year of the Truman  adminis- 
tration  the GNP  deflator  accelerated  sharply,  as shown  in the table. But  this may  reflect  a 
measurement  problem  since the CPI did not accelerate  significantly.  On the other hand, 
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little weight to raw opportunism,  would presumably  have relaxed  their 
ideological  goals as the election approached  in order to stay in power 
and  pursue  their  ideological  preferences  in subsequent  years. 
These results can, I think, be explained by adding to Nordhaus's 
elements  of ideology and opportunism  a third  element that  plays a very 
large role in economic policymaking,  but that is usually absent from 
economists' modeling  of political and policy games. Adherents  of the 
two macroeconomic "ideologies" seem to believe in two different 
models  of the economy, each of which  minimizes  the economic costs of 
achieving their own particular  preferences, for low unemployment  in 
one case and low inflation  in the other. Hence, both parties when in 
power  are subject  to making  systematic  "mistakes." 
Most economic studies of political  and economic games assume that 
the actors all share a common economic model and differ  only in their 
preference  functions. But for a long time I have been struck by how 
much debate about macroeconomic policy tends to revolve around 
differences  in models  rather  than  overt  differences  in preferences.  James 
Tobin and Henry Wallich  not only had different  objective functions in 
unemployment  and inflation  space, but also had  different  coefficients  in 
their  augmented  Phillips  curves. And in the world  of political  discourse 
and policymaking,  differences  in ideological  preferences  and economic 
models get all mixed up together. In the postwar period, most liberal 
politicians  have not only been expansionists,  they have also believed in 
a benign  Phillips  curve with a relatively  shallow slope and a very slow 
or perhaps  nonexistent  shift toward  the vertical. Conservatives  (of the 
pre-Reagan-Kemp  stripe)  have tended to believe in  just the opposite: a 
steep short-run  slope to the Phillips  curve and a relatively  quick shift to 
the vertical. The politicians of each party more than half-convinced 
themselves that they could have their cake and eat it too. And so, each 
party,  when in power, started  out by assuming  it would not have to give 
up much by way of worse unemployment  or inflation to get better 
inflation  or unemployment.  Some learning  occurred  while in power, but 
once out of power the earlier  reliance on the preferred  Phillips  curve, 
pandering  to ideological  preferences,  reasserted  itself. It is because  their 
models were excessively optimistic  that parties  in power often pursued 
policies that  opportunism,  combined  with a "true"  understanding  of the 
trade-offs,  would  have counseled  them  to moderate.  A major  part  of the 
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Table 2.  Explanatory Elements in the Political Business Cyclea 
Independent  Equation  1  Equation  2 
variable  coefficient  coefficent 
Dummy Rfirstb  -2.4  -1.8 
(-  1.8)  (1.6) 
Dummy  Dfirstb  3.4  3.7 
(2.5)  (3.2) 
Dummy  lastc  1.9  2.9 
(1.7)  (2.9) 
Dummy  oild  3.3  -3.5 
(-1.9)  (-2.4) 
Dummy  Eisen 2/2e  ...  -5.2 
(-2.7) 
Gap <,  -0.3  -0.3 
(-2.2)  (-2.7) 
DPGNP-  19  -0.2  -0.3 
(-1.1)  (-~~~1.9) 
Summary  statistic 
Rj2  0.70  0.80 
Standard  error  2.2  1.8 
a.  Dependent variable is the two-year  percentage point change in GNP gap beginning in the fourth quarter of each 
even-numbered  year. Numbers  in parentheses-are  t-statistics. 
b.  Represents  the first two  years of Republican and Democratic  administrations,  respectively. 
c.  A constant  representing the expansionary  policy  of the last two  years of an administration,  typically  followed 
by Republicans and Democrats  alike. 
d.  Represents  the oil shocks  in 1973-74 and 1979-80. 
e.  Represents  the last two  years of Eisenhower's  second  term in office. 
f.  Level  of GNP gap at end of prior period. 
g.  Two-quarter annual rate of inflation at end of prior period. 
Table 2 and figure 1 represent  an effort to show how potent are the 
combined forces of ideology, opportunism,  and initial conditions in 
explaining  two-year  swings in GNP over the past 40 years. 
The dependent  variable  in the equation  in table 2 is the change  in the 
GNP gap over two-year  intervals  starting  in the fourth  quarter  of every 
even-numbered  year:  each presidential  term  contains  two observations. 
The equation  reported  in the table has some similarity  with several of 
the equations  reported  in the recent  Alesina-Sachs  article, but there are 
some important  differences. The first difference  is that, for a given set 
of initial  conditions,  Republican  administrations  in the first  two years of 
their term pursued  restrictive  economic policies (the dummy variable 
for Republican  first terms, Rfirst, has a negative coefficient), while 
Democrats  pursued  expansionary  policies (the dummy  for Democrats, 
Dfirst,  is positive). Second, contrary  to Alesina's findings,  both parties 62  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
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tended  to pursue  expansionary  polices in  their  last two  years;  the  constant 
in the equation (which I call Dummy last) has a positive coefficient. 
Third,  the two oil shocks in 1973-74  and 1979-80  directly  and indirectly 
exerted strong negative effects; the coefficient on the oil dummy is 
strongly  negative. 
Initial  conditions are specified as the level of the GNP gap and the 
two-quarter  inflation  rate at the end of the prior  period. The lower the 
level of GNP relative to potential  and the lower the inflation  rate, the 
larger the subsequent growth of GNP, regardless of party. But, as 
indicated  by the coefficients  on the  political dummies,  initial  conditions 
and oil shocks are not alone sufficient to explain subsequent move- 
ments-party ideology  and  opportunism  both play roles. 
As noted earlier, the last two years of Eisenhower's second term 
present a distinct  anomaly.  When this particular  period  is excluded, as 
it is in equation  2, the size and significance  of the opportunism  dummy, 
Dummy last, increases substantially,  and the equation generally im- 
proves greatly. William D. Nordhaus  63 
This brings me to  my final comment. Evidence from economic 
outcomes does appear  to support  the hypothesis of a political  business 
cycle responding  to an interaction  of the three elements of ideology, 
opportunism,  and  excessively optimistic  economic  models. And yet it is 
hard to identify a correspondingly  strong political timetable in the 
instruments  of monetary  and fiscal policy that would presumably  have 
to be used to implement  ideological and opportunistic  political goals. 
Before 1979  the Federal  Reserve  tended  to accommodate  the proclivities 
of the administration,  always reserving  the right  to lean  just a bit against 
the wind. But Nordhaus  shows that the timing  of discount  rate changes 
does not fit a political  model, except that the Federal Reserve kept its 
head  down  in  the  month  before  elections. And  not  because  I am  enamored 
of its usefulness,  but  in lieu of anything  better,  I played  with  entering  the 
real money supply growth with varying lags in my equation and got 
nowhere.  Similarly  an informal  but careful  inspection  of the data  led me 
to conclude  that changes in the high-employment  federal  budget  deficit 
do not fit easily into what would be predicted  from the business cycle. 
And aside from  the timing  of social security  tax changes-which  in any 
event were not manipulated  for macroeconomic  reasons-Nordhaus's 
own empirical  efforts  and  his survey  of the literature  show  little  evidence 
of a systematic political component  in fiscal policy. There is a puzzle: 
data on outcomes show a strong political component;  data on policy 
inputs  do not. 
If I had  more  time, I would  argue  that  the combination  of Reaganomics 
and the acquisition  by the Volcker Federal Reserve of much greater 
political  independence  may have broken  the postwar mold of political 
business cycles. The political cycle is not what it used to be. But I do 
not have that  time. 
General Discussion 
Daniel  Mitchell  recommended  including  additional  features  of voter 
behavior  in economic models of the political  business cycle. One is that 
voters act to insure themselves when they split tickets and elect, for 
example, a Republican  president  and a Democratic  Congress, as they 
did  in the  last  election. Another  is the high  and  growing  rate  of abstention 
from  voting,  which  is probably  a rational  realization  that  one vote among 64  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
the millions does not matter. William Poole observed that another 
complication  for  economic  modeling  of the political  business  cycle arises 
in countries  with a parliamentary  system in which the prime minister 
can choose when to call the election. 
Christopher  Sims thought  it important  to explain how there can be 
large  aggregate  demand  effects  at  the start  of a presidential  administration 
despite  the apparent  absence of systematic  movements  in the use of the 
direct tools of aggregate  demand policy. He suggested that a party's 
ideology might  lead it to undertake  certain  microeconomic  actions that 
redistribute  income and that have temporary  macroeconomic  side ef- 
fects. Charles  Holt  noted  that  the relationship  between  a party's  ideology 
and its actions may be complex, reflecting  competing concerns. He 
mentioned  Stephen  Magee's finding  that  periods  during  which there are 
many  Republicans  in the House of Representatives  coincide  with enact- 
ment of restrictive trade legislation, in apparent  contradiction  to the 
Republican  free-trade  ideology. However, the Republican  party  is also 
committed  to anti-inflationary  policies  that  generate  unemployment.  The 
trade  restrictions  can thus be seen as a politically  necessary attempt  to 
avoid losing  jobs to foreigners  at a time when unemployment  is already 
a hot political  issue. 
There  was considerable  discussion of the evidence that  the economy 
seems to go into recession during  a Republican  administration  and into 
a boom during  a Democratic  administration.  Robert Gordon  reported 
that this finding  applied only to relatively recent history. Using the 
NBER chronology  to count  the 24 administrations  elected between 1856 
and 1952, he found that a NBER recession began within the first two 
years in 9 of 14 Republican  administrations  and in 7 of 10 Democratic 
administrations,  indicating  a slightly  higher  incidence of recessions for 
the Democrats. William Poole noted that parties' economic policies 
change over time. The Republicans,  for example, were once the party 
known for imposing  fiscal responsibility  by raising  taxes. Parties also 
find new ways to take advantage  of voters' incomplete information. 
Nixon's price controls were one such innovation  and were politically 
successful at the time but would not be now. William  Nordhaus  agreed 
that party  policy changes  over time and that it should  not be surprising 
that parties' policies during the nineteenth century differ from their 
current  policies. Steven Durlauf  found the statistical  evidence for the 
existence of a PBC unconvincing. Although political variables alone William D. Nordhaus  65 
seem to predict  unemployment,  when lagged  inflation  is included  in the 
same  equation,  the  importance  of the  political  variables  becomes  unclear. 
Nordhaus  thought  that  the table  in  Alesina's  discussion  posed a puzzle 
to proponents of  ideological parties because the second halves of 
administrations  look much alike. Parties  thus seem to act according  to 
ideology  at first,  but  then  revert  to more  opportunistic  behavior.  Alesina 
replied  that  the parties  could remain  ideological  throughout  their  admin- 
istrations,  while economic performance  converged  in the second halves 
because the parties lost their ability to affect output once the private 
sector adjusted  to the ideological  regime. 
The discussion turned  to the mechanism  through  which the political 
business cycle operates. Durlauf  reported  that he has found an eight- 
year  cycle in tax rates,  which  corresponds  roughly  to changes  in political 
administrations.  Nancy Teeters thought that public expenditure had 
often been used to promote  favorable  election results  for the incumbent 
president.  Such expenditures  should  be evident  in the budgets  of federal 
agencies such as the Army  Corps  of Engineers,  the Bureau  of Reclama- 
tion, and the Department  of Housing and Urban Development. As to 
timing,  the politically  important  action is approval  of the funding,  while 
the actual  expenditure  can show up some time after  the election. 
David Romer  objected  to the classification  of two terms of the same 
president  as two separate  observations.  Usually,  presidents  get reelected 
easily. The recessions that  follow Republicans'  initial  election wins can 
be explained  as the result  of their  ideological  conviction  to bring  inflation 
down  and  keep  it down. On  this  reasoning,  it  is a puzzle  why a Republican 
president who gets reelected should be expected to create another 
recession.  Mitchell  reflected  that  one implication  of PBC theory  may be 
that  there  should  be no limit  on the number  of terms  for  which  a president 
may  be elected.  That  a president  has  to worry  about  reelection  constrains 
him  on how much  he can manipulate  the economy. 66  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
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